

# A Formalization of Declassification with WHAT&WHERE-Security

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## Abstract

Research in information-flow security aims at developing methods to identify undesired information leaks within programs from private sources to public sinks. Noninterference captures this intuition by requiring that no information whatsoever flows from private sources to public sinks. However, in practice this definition is often too strict: Depending on the intuitive desired security policy, the controlled declassification of certain private information (WHAT) at certain points in the program (WHERE) might not result in an undesired information leak.

We present an Isabelle/HOL formalization of such a security property for controlled declassification, namely WHAT&WHERE-security from [2]. The formalization includes compositionality proofs for and a soundness proof for a security type system that checks for programs in a simple while language with dynamic thread creation.

Our formalization of the security type system is abstract in the language for expressions and in the semantic side conditions for expressions. It can easily be instantiated with different syntactic approximations for these side conditions. The soundness proof of such an instantiation boils down to showing that these syntactic approximations imply the semantic side conditions.

This Isabelle/HOL formalization uses theories from the entry Strong-Security (see proof document for details).

## Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Preliminary definitions</b>	<b>2</b>
1.1	Type synonyms . . . . .	2
<b>2</b>	<b>WHAT&amp;WHERE-security</b>	<b>4</b>
2.1	Definition of WHAT&WHERE-security . . . . .	4
2.2	Proof technique for compositionality results . . . . .	7
2.3	Proof of parallel compositionality . . . . .	11

<b>3</b>	<b>Example language and compositionality proofs</b>	<b>18</b>
3.1	Example language with dynamic thread creation . . . . .	18
3.2	Proofs of atomic compositionality results . . . . .	22
3.3	Proofs of non-atomic compositionality results . . . . .	26
<b>4</b>	<b>Security type system</b>	<b>49</b>
4.1	Abstract security type system with soundness proof . . . . .	49
4.2	Example language for Boolean and arithmetic expressions . .	52
4.3	Example interpretation of abstract security type system . . .	53

# 1 Preliminary definitions

## 1.1 Type synonyms

The formalization is parametric in different aspects. Notably, it is parametric in the security lattice it supports.

For better readability, we use the following type synonyms in our formalization (from the entry Strong-Security):

```
theory Types
imports Main
begin

— type parameters:
— 'exp: expressions (arithmetic, boolean...)
— 'val: values
— 'id: identifier names
— 'com: commands
— 'd: domains
```

This is a collection of type synonyms. Note that not all of these type synonyms are used within Strong-Security - some are used in WHATandWHERE-Security.

— type for memory states - map ids to values  
**type-synonym** ('*id*, '*val*) *State* = '*id*  $\Rightarrow$  '*val*

— type for evaluation functions mapping expressions to a values depending on a state

**type-synonym** ('*exp*, '*id*, '*val*) *Evalfunction* =  
'*exp*  $\Rightarrow$  ('*id*, '*val*) *State*  $\Rightarrow$  '*val*

— define configurations with threads as pair of commands and states  
**type-synonym** ('*id*, '*val*, '*com*) *TConfig* = '*com*  $\times$  ('*id*, '*val*) *State*

— define configurations with thread pools as pair of command lists (thread pool) and states

**type-synonym** ('*id*, '*val*, '*com*) *TPConfig* =  
 ('*com* list)  $\times$  ('*id*, '*val*) *State*

— type for program states (including the set of commands and a symbol for terminating - None)

**type-synonym** '*com* *ProgramState* = '*com* option

— type for configurations with program states

**type-synonym** ('*id*, '*val*, '*com*) *PSConfig* =  
 '*com* *ProgramState*  $\times$  ('*id*, '*val*) *State*

— type for labels with a list of spawned threads

**type-synonym** '*com* *Label* = '*com* list

— type for step relations from single commands to a program state, with a label

**type-synonym** ('*exp*, '*id*, '*val*, '*com*) *TLSteps* =  
 (('*id*, '*val*, '*com*) *TConfig*  $\times$  '*com* *Label*  
 $\times$  ('*id*, '*val*, '*com*) *PSConfig*) set

— curried version of previously defined type

**type-synonym** ('*exp*, '*id*, '*val*, '*com*) *TLSteps-curry* =  
 '*com*  $\Rightarrow$  ('*id*, '*val*) *State*  $\Rightarrow$  '*com* *Label*  $\Rightarrow$  '*com* *ProgramState*  
 $\Rightarrow$  ('*id*, '*val*) *State*  $\Rightarrow$  bool

— type for step relations from thread pools to thread pools

**type-synonym** ('*exp*, '*id*, '*val*, '*com*) *TPSteps* =  
 (('*id*, '*val*, '*com*) *TPConfig*  $\times$  ('*id*, '*val*, '*com*) *TPConfig*) set

— curried version of previously defined type

**type-synonym** ('*exp*, '*id*, '*val*, '*com*) *TPSteps-curry* =  
 '*com* list  $\Rightarrow$  ('*id*, '*val*) *State*  $\Rightarrow$  '*com* list  $\Rightarrow$  ('*id*, '*val*) *State*  $\Rightarrow$  bool

— define type of step relations for single threads to thread pools

**type-synonym** ('*exp*, '*id*, '*val*, '*com*) *TSteps* =  
 (('*id*, '*val*, '*com*) *TConfig*  $\times$  ('*id*, '*val*, '*com*) *TPConfig*) set

— define the same type as *TSteps*, but in a curried version (allowing syntax abbreviations)

**type-synonym** ('*exp*, '*id*, '*val*, '*com*) *TSteps-curry* =  
 '*com*  $\Rightarrow$  ('*id*, '*val*) *State*  $\Rightarrow$  '*com* list  $\Rightarrow$  ('*id*, '*val*) *State*  $\Rightarrow$  bool

— type for simple domain assignments; '*d* has to be an instance of order (partial order)

**type-synonym** ('*id*, '*d*) *DomainAssignment* = '*id*  $\Rightarrow$  '*d*::order

**type-synonym** '*com* *Bisimulation-type* = (('*com* list)  $\times$  ('*com* list)) set

— type for escape hatches

**type-synonym** ('*d*, '*exp*) *Hatch* = '*d*  $\times$  '*exp*

```

— type for sets of escape hatches
type-synonym ('d, 'exp) Hatches = (('d, 'exp) Hatch) set

— type for local escape hatches
type-synonym ('d, 'exp) lHatch = 'd × 'exp × nat

— type for sets of local escape hatches
type-synonym ('d, 'exp) lHatches = (('d, 'exp) lHatch) set

end

```

## 2 WHAT&WHERE-security

### 2.1 Definition of WHAT&WHERE-security

The definition of WHAT&WHERE-security is parametric in a security lattice ( $'d$ ) and in a programming language ( $'com$ ).

```

theory WHATWHERE-Security
imports ..;/Strong-Security/Types
begin

locale WHATWHERE =
  fixes SR :: ('exp, 'id, 'val, 'com) TLSteps
  and E :: ('exp, 'id, 'val) Evalfunction
  and pp :: 'com ⇒ nat
  and DA :: ('id, 'd::order) DomainAssignment
  and lH :: ('d::order, 'exp) lHatches

begin

— define when two states are indistinguishable for an observer on domain d
definition d-equal :: 'd::order ⇒ ('id, 'val) State
  ⇒ ('id, 'val) State ⇒ bool
where
d-equal d m m' ≡ ∀ x. ((DA x) ≤ d → (m x) = (m' x))

abbreviation d-equal' :: ('id, 'val) State
  ⇒ 'd::order ⇒ ('id, 'val) State ⇒ bool
  ( (- =_ -) )
where
m =_d m' ≡ d-equal d m m'

— transitivity of d-equality
lemma d-equal-trans:

```

$\llbracket m =_d m'; m' =_d m'' \rrbracket \implies m =_d m''$   
**by** (*simp add: d-equal-def*)

**abbreviation** *SRabbr* :: ('exp, 'id, 'val, 'com) *TLSteps-curry*

((1⟨-,/-⟩) → $\triangleleft\triangleright$ / (1⟨-,/-⟩) [0,0,0,0] 81)

**where**

$\langle c, m \rangle \rightarrow\triangleleft\alpha\triangleright \langle p, m' \rangle \equiv ((c, m), \alpha, (p, m')) \in SR$

— function for obtaining the unique memory (state) after one step for a command and a memory (state)

**definition** *NextMem* :: 'com ⇒ ('id, 'val) *State* ⇒ ('id, 'val) *State*

( $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket(-)$ )

**where**

$\llbracket c \rrbracket(m) \equiv (\text{THE } m'. (\exists p \alpha. \langle c, m \rangle \rightarrow\triangleleft\alpha\triangleright \langle p, m' \rangle))$

— function getting all escape hatches for some location

**definition** *htchLoc* :: nat ⇒ ('d, 'exp) *Hatches*

**where**

$htchLoc \iota \equiv \{(d, e). (d, e, \iota) \in lH\}$

— function for getting all escape hatches for some set of locations

**definition** *htchLocSet* :: nat set ⇒ ('d, 'exp) *Hatches*

**where**

$htchLocSet PP \equiv \bigcup \{h. (\exists \iota \in PP. h = htchLoc \iota)\}$

— predicate for (d,H)-equality

**definition** *dH-equal* :: 'd ⇒ ('d, 'exp) *Hatches*

⇒ ('id, 'val) *State* ⇒ ('id, 'val) *State* ⇒ bool

**where**

$dH\text{-equal } d H m m' \equiv (m =_d m' \wedge (\forall (d', e) \in H. (d' \leq d \longrightarrow (E e m = E e m'))))$

**abbreviation** *dH-equal'* :: ('id, 'val) *State* ⇒ 'd ⇒ ('d, 'exp) *Hatches*

⇒ ('id, 'val) *State* ⇒ bool

( (- ~,-,-) )

**where**

$m \sim_{d, H} m' \equiv dH\text{-equal } d H m m'$

— predicate indicating that a command is not a d-declassification command

**definition** *NDC* :: 'd ⇒ 'com ⇒ bool

**where**

$NDC d c \equiv (\forall m m'. m =_d m' \longrightarrow \llbracket c \rrbracket(m) =_d \llbracket c \rrbracket(m'))$

— predicate indicating an ‘immediate d-declassification command’ for a set of escape hatches

**definition** *IDC* :: 'd ⇒ 'com ⇒ ('d, 'exp) *Hatches* ⇒ bool

**where**

$IDC d c H \equiv (\exists m m'. m =_d m' \wedge$   
 $(\neg \llbracket c \rrbracket(m) =_d \llbracket c \rrbracket(m')))$   
 $\wedge (\forall m m'. m \sim_{d,H} m' \longrightarrow \llbracket c \rrbracket(m) =_d \llbracket c \rrbracket(m'))$

**definition**  $stepResultsinR :: 'com ProgramState \Rightarrow 'com ProgramState$   
 $\Rightarrow 'com Bisimulation-type \Rightarrow bool$   
**where**  
 $stepResultsinR p p' R \equiv (p = None \wedge p' = None) \vee$   
 $(\exists c c'. (p = Some c \wedge p' = Some c' \wedge ([c],[c']) \in R))$

**definition**  $dhequality-alternative :: 'd \Rightarrow nat set \Rightarrow nat$   
 $\Rightarrow ('id, 'val) State \Rightarrow ('id, 'val) State \Rightarrow bool$   
**where**  
 $dhequality-alternative d PP \iota m m' \equiv m \sim_{d,(htchLocSet PP)} m' \vee$   
 $(\neg (htchLoc \iota) \subseteq (htchLocSet PP))$

**definition**  $Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation :: 'd \Rightarrow nat set$   
 $\Rightarrow 'com Bisimulation-type \Rightarrow bool$   
**where**  
 $Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation d PP R \equiv$   
 $(sym R) \wedge (trans R) \wedge$   
 $(\forall (V,V') \in R. length V = length V') \wedge$   
 $(\forall (V,V') \in R. \forall i < length V.$   
 $((NDC d (V!i)) \vee$   
 $(IDC d (V!i) (htchLoc (pp (V!i)))))) \wedge$   
 $(\forall (V,V') \in R. \forall i < length V. \forall m1 m1' m2 \alpha p.$   
 $(\langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m2 \rangle \wedge m1 \sim_{d,(htchLocSet PP)} m1')$   
 $\longrightarrow (\exists p' \alpha' m2'. (\langle V'!i, m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle p', m2' \rangle \wedge$   
 $(stepResultsinR p p' R) \wedge (\alpha, \alpha') \in R \wedge$   
 $(dhequality-alternative d PP (pp (V!i)) m2 m2'))))$

— predicate to define when a program is strongly secure

**definition**  $WHATWHERE-Secure :: 'com list \Rightarrow bool$   
**where**  
 $WHATWHERE-Secure V \equiv (\forall d PP.$   
 $(\exists R. Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation d PP R \wedge (V, V) \in R))$

— auxiliary lemma to obtain central strong (d,lH,PP)-Bisimulation property as Lemma in meta logic (allows instantiating all the variables manually if necessary)

**lemma**  $strongdlHPPB-aux:$

$$\begin{aligned} & \wedge V V' m1' m2 p i \alpha. \llbracket Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation d PP R; \\ & i < length V; (V, V') \in R; \\ & \langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m2 \rangle; m1 \sim_{d,(htchLocSet PP)} m1' \rrbracket \\ & \implies (\exists p' \alpha' m2'. \langle V'!i, m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle p', m2' \rangle \\ & \wedge stepResultsinR p p' R \wedge (\alpha, \alpha') \in R \wedge \\ & (dhequality-alternative d PP (pp (V!i)) m2 m2')) \end{aligned}$$

```

by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def, fastforce)
— auxiliary lemma to obtain 'NDC or IDC' from strong (d,lH,PP)-Bisimulation as
lemma in meta logic allowing instantiation of the variables
lemma strongdlHPPB-NDCIDCaux:
 $\lambda V V'. \exists i. [Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation d PP R;$ 
 $(V, V') \in R; i < length V]$ 
 $\implies (NDC d (V!i) \vee IDC d (V!i) (htchLoc (pp (V!i))))$ 
by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def, auto)
lemma WHATWHERE-empty:
WHATWHERE-Secure []
by (simp add: WHATWHERE-Secure-def, auto,
rule-tac x={[],[]} in exI,
simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def sym-def trans-def)
end
end

```

## 2.2 Proof technique for compositionality results

For proving compositionality results for WHAT&WHERE-security, we formalize the following “up-to technique” and prove it sound:

```

theory Up-To-Technique
imports WHATWHERE-Security
begin

context WHATWHERE
begin

abbreviation SdlHPPB where SdlHPPB  $\equiv$  Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation

```

— define the ‘reflexive part’ of a relation (sets of elements which are related with themselves by the given relation)

**definition** Arefl ::  $('a \times 'a) set \Rightarrow 'a set$

**where**

$Arefl R = \{e. (e,e) \in R\}$

```

lemma commonArefl-subset-commonDomain:
 $(Arefl R1 \cap Arefl R2) \subseteq (Domain R1 \cap Domain R2)$ 
by (simp add: Arefl-def, auto)

```

— define disjoint strong (d,lH,PP)-bisimulation up-to-R’ for a relation R

**definition** disj-dlHPP-Bisimulation-Up-To-R’ ::

$'d \Rightarrow nat set \Rightarrow 'com Bisimulation-type$

```

 $\Rightarrow 'com\ Bisimulation-type \Rightarrow bool$ 
where

$$\begin{aligned}
& disj-dlHPP\text{-}Bisimulation-Up-To-R' d PP R' R \equiv \\
& SdlHPPB d PP R' \wedge (\text{sym } R) \wedge (\text{trans } R) \\
& \wedge (\forall (V, V') \in R. \text{length } V = \text{length } V') \wedge \\
& (\forall (V, V') \in R. \forall i < \text{length } V. \\
& ((NDC d (V!i)) \vee \\
& (IDC d (V!i) (\text{htchLoc} (pp (V!i))))) \wedge \\
& (\forall (V, V') \in R. \forall i < \text{length } V. \forall m1 m1' m2 \alpha p. \\
& (\langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m2 \rangle \wedge m1 \sim_d, (\text{htchLocSet } PP) m1') \\
& \longrightarrow (\exists p' \alpha' m2'. \langle V'!i, m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle p', m2' \rangle \wedge \\
& (\text{stepResultsInR } p p' (R \cup R')) \wedge (\alpha, \alpha') \in (R \cup R') \wedge \\
& (\text{dhequality-alternative } d PP (pp (V!i)) m2 m2'))))
\end{aligned}$$


```

— lemma about the transitivity of the union of symmetric and transitive relations under certain circumstances

**lemma** *trans-RuR'*:

```

assumes transR: trans R
assumes symR: sym R
assumes transR': trans R'
assumes symR': sym R'
assumes eqlenR:  $\forall (V, V') \in R. \text{length } V = \text{length } V'$ 
assumes eqlenR':  $\forall (V, V') \in R'. \text{length } V = \text{length } V'$ 
assumes AreflAssump:  $(\text{Arefl } R \cap \text{Arefl } R') \subseteq \{\}\}$ 
shows trans ( $R \cup R'$ )
proof –
{
  fix  $V V' V''$ 
  assume  $p1: (V, V') \in (R \cup R')$ 
  assume  $p2: (V', V'') \in (R \cup R')$ 

  from  $p1 p2$  have  $(V, V'') \in (R \cup R')$ 
  proof (auto)
    assume  $inR1: (V, V') \in R$ 
    assume  $inR2: (V', V'') \in R$ 
    from  $inR1 inR2$  transR show  $(V, V'') \in R$ 
    unfolding trans-def
    by blast
  next
    assume  $inR'1: (V, V') \in R'$ 
    assume  $inR'2: (V', V'') \in R'$ 
    assume  $notinR': (V, V'') \notin R'$ 
    from  $inR'1 inR'2$  transR' have  $inR': (V, V'') \in R'$ 
    unfolding trans-def
    by blast
    from  $notinR' inR'$  have False
    by auto
    thus  $(V, V'') \in R ..$ 
  next

```

```

assume inR1:  $(V, V') \in R$ 
assume inR2:  $(V', V'') \in R'$ 
from inR1 symR transR have  $(V, V) \in R \wedge (V', V') \in R$ 
  unfolding sym-def trans-def
  by blast
hence AreflR:  $\{V, V'\} \subseteq \text{Arefl } R$  by (simp add: Arefl-def)
from inR2 symR' transR' have  $(V', V') \in R' \wedge (V'', V'') \in R'$ 
  unfolding sym-def trans-def
  by blast
hence AreflR':  $\{V', V''\} \subseteq \text{Arefl } R'$  by (simp add: Arefl-def)

from AreflR AreflR' AreflAssump have V'empt:  $V' = []$ 
  by (simp add: Arefl-def, blast)
with inR2 eqlenR' have  $V' = V''$  by auto
with inR1 show  $(V, V') \in R$  by auto
next
  assume inR1:  $(V, V') \in R'$ 
  assume inR2:  $(V', V'') \in R$ 
  from inR1 symR' transR' have  $(V, V) \in R' \wedge (V', V') \in R'$ 
    unfolding sym-def trans-def
    by blast
  hence AreflR':  $\{V, V'\} \subseteq \text{Arefl } R'$  by (simp add: Arefl-def)
  from inR2 symR transR have  $(V', V') \in R \wedge (V'', V'') \in R$ 
    unfolding sym-def trans-def
    by blast
  hence AreflR:  $\{V', V''\} \subseteq \text{Arefl } R$  by (simp add: Arefl-def)

  from AreflR AreflR' AreflAssump have V'empt:  $V' = []$ 
    by (simp add: Arefl-def, blast)
  with inR1 eqlenR' have  $V' = V$  by auto
  with inR2 show  $(V, V'') \in R$  by auto
qed
}
thus ?thesis unfolding trans-def by force

qed

lemma Up-To-Technique:
 $\llbracket \text{disj-dlHPP-Bisimulation-Up-To-}R' \text{ d PP } R' \text{ R};$ 
 $\text{Arefl } R \cap \text{Arefl } R' \subseteq \{[]\} \rrbracket$ 
 $\implies \text{SdlHPPB d PP } (R \cup R')$ 
proof (simp add: disj-dlHPP-Bisimulation-Up-To-R'-def
  Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def, auto)
assume symR': sym R'
assume symR: sym R
with symR' show sym  $(R \cup R')$ 
  by (simp add: sym-def)
next
assume symR': sym R'

```

```

assume symR: sym R
assume transR': trans R'
assume transR: trans R
assume eqlenR':  $\forall (V, V') \in R'. \text{length } V = \text{length } V'$ 
assume eqlenR:  $\forall (V, V') \in R. \text{length } V = \text{length } V'$ 
assume areflAssump: Arefl R  $\cap$  Arefl R'  $\subseteq \{\emptyset\}$ 
from symR' symR transR transR eqlenR' eqlenR areflAssump trans-RuR'
show trans (R  $\cup$  R')
by blast
— condition about IDC and NDC and equal length already proven above by auto
tactic!
next
fix V V' i m1 m1' m2 α p
assume inR: (V, V')  $\in R$ 
assume irange: i < length V
assume step:  $\langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m2 \rangle$ 
assume dhequal: m1  $\sim_{d,(\text{htchLocSet PP})} m1'$ 
assume disjBisimUpTo:  $\forall (V, V') \in R. \forall i < \text{length } V. \forall m1 m1' m2 \alpha p.$ 
 $\langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m2 \rangle \wedge m1 \sim_{d,(\text{htchLocSet PP})} m1' \rightarrow$ 
 $(\exists p' \alpha' m2'. \langle V'!i, m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle p', m2' \rangle \wedge$ 
 $\text{stepResultsinR } p \text{ } p' (R \cup R') \wedge ((\alpha, \alpha') \in R \vee (\alpha, \alpha') \in R') \wedge$ 
 $\text{dhequality-alternative } d \text{ PP } (pp (V!i)) \text{ } m2 \text{ } m2'$ 
from inR irange step dhequal disjBisimUpTo show  $\exists p' \alpha' m2'.$ 
 $\langle V'!i, m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle p', m2' \rangle \wedge \text{stepResultsinR } p \text{ } p' (R \cup R') \wedge$ 
 $((\alpha, \alpha') \in R \vee (\alpha, \alpha') \in R') \wedge$ 
 $\text{dhequality-alternative } d \text{ PP } (pp (V!i)) \text{ } m2 \text{ } m2'$ 
by blast
next
fix V V' i m1 m1' m2 α p
assume inR': (V, V')  $\in R'$ 
assume irange: i < length V
assume step:  $\langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m2 \rangle$ 
assume dhequal: m1  $\sim_{d,(\text{htchLocSet PP})} m1'$ 
assume disjBisimUpTo:  $\forall (V, V') \in R'. \forall i < \text{length } V. \forall m1 m1' m2 \alpha p.$ 
 $\langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m2 \rangle \wedge m1 \sim_{d,(\text{htchLocSet PP})} m1' \rightarrow$ 
 $(\exists p' \alpha' m2'. \langle V'!i, m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle p', m2' \rangle \wedge$ 
 $\text{stepResultsinR } p \text{ } p' R' \wedge (\alpha, \alpha') \in R' \wedge$ 
 $\text{dhequality-alternative } d \text{ PP } (pp (V!i)) \text{ } m2 \text{ } m2'$ 
from inR' irange step dhequal disjBisimUpTo show  $\exists p' \alpha' m2'.$ 
 $\langle V'!i, m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle p', m2' \rangle \wedge \text{stepResultsinR } p \text{ } p' (R \cup R') \wedge$ 
 $((\alpha, \alpha') \in R \vee (\alpha, \alpha') \in R') \wedge$ 
 $\text{dhequality-alternative } d \text{ PP } (pp (V!i)) \text{ } m2 \text{ } m2'$ 
by (simp add: stepResultsinR-def, fastforce)
qed

```

**lemma** Union-Strong-dlHPP-Bisim:  
 $\llbracket SdlHPPB d \text{ PP } R; SdlHPPB d \text{ PP } R';$   
 $\text{Areft } R \cap \text{Areft } R' \subseteq \{\emptyset\} \rrbracket$

```

 $\implies SdlHPPB d PP (R \cup R')$ 
by (rule Up-To-Technique, simp-all add:
  disj-dlHPP-Bisimulation-Up-To-R'-def
  Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def stepResultsinR-def, fastforce)

lemma adding-emptypair-keeps-SdlHPPB:
  assumes SdlHPP: SdlHPPB d PP R
  shows SdlHPPB d PP (R \cup \{[],[]\})
proof -
  have SdlHPPemp: SdlHPPB d PP \{[],[]\}
    by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def sym-def trans-def)

  have commonDom: Domain R \cap Domain \{[],[]\} \subseteq \{[]
    by auto

  with commonAreft-subset-commonDomain have Areftassump:
    Areft R \cap Areft \{[],[]\} \subseteq \{[]
    by force

  with SdlHPP SdlHPPemp Union-Strong-dlHPP-Bisim show
    SdlHPPB d PP (R \cup \{[],[]\})
    by force
  qed

end

end

```

### 2.3 Proof of parallel compositionality

We prove that WHAT&WHERE-security is preserved under composition of WHAT&WHERE-secure threads.

```

theory Parallel-Composition
imports Up-To-Technique MWLs
begin

locale WHATWHERE-Secure-Programs =
  L : MWLs-semantics E BMap
  + WWs : WHATWHERE MWLsSteps-det E pp DA lH
  for E :: ('exp, 'id, 'val) Evalfunction
  and BMap :: 'val  $\Rightarrow$  bool
  and DA :: ('id, 'd::order) DomainAssignment
  and lH :: ('d, 'exp) lHatches
  begin

```

```

lemma SdlHPPB-restricted-on-PP-is-SdlHPPB:

```

```

assumes SdlHPPB: SdlHPPB d PP R'
assumes inR': (V,V) ∈ R'
assumes Rdef: R = {(V',V''). (V',V'') ∈ R'
  ∧ set (PPV V') ⊆ set (PPV V)
  ∧ set (PPV V'') ⊆ set (PPV V)}
shows SdlHPPB d PP R
proof (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def, auto)
  from SdlHPPB have sym R'
    by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def)
  with Rdef show sym R
    by (simp add: sym-def)
next
  from SdlHPPB have trans R'
    by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def)
  with Rdef show trans R
    by (simp add: trans-def, auto)
next
  fix V' V''
  assume inR-part: (V',V'') ∈ R
  with SdlHPPB Rdef show length V' = length V''
    by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def, auto)
next
  fix V' V'' i
  assume inR-part: (V',V'') ∈ R
  assume irange: i < length V'
  assume notIDC:
    ¬ IDC d (V'!i) (htchLoc (pp (V'!i)))
  with SdlHPPB inR-part irange Rdef
    show NDC d (V'!i)
      by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def, auto)
next
  fix V' V'' i α p m1 m1' m2
  assume inR-part: (V',V'') ∈ R
  assume irange: i < length V'
  assume step: ⟨V'!i,m1⟩ → $\triangleleft$ α⟨p,m2⟩
  assume dhequal: m1 ~d,(htchLocSet PP) m1'
from inR-part SdlHPPB Rdef have eqlen: length V' = length V''
  by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def, auto)

from inR-part Rdef
have set (PPV V') ⊆ set (PPV V) ∧ set (PPV V'') ⊆ set (PPV V)
  by auto

with irange PPc-in-PPV-version eqlen
have PPc-Vs-at-i:
  set (PPc (V'!i)) ⊆ set (PPV V) ∧ set (PPc (V''!i)) ⊆ set (PPV V)
  by (metis subset-trans)

```

```

from SdlHPPB inR-part Rdef irange step dhequal
  strongdlHPPB-aux[of d PP R' i
    V' V'' m1 α p m2 m1']
obtain p' α' m2' where stepreq: ⟨V'!i,m1⟩ → ◁α'▷ ⟨p',m2'⟩ ∧
  stepResultsinR p p' R' ∧ (α,α') ∈ R' ∧
  dhequality-alternative d PP (pp (V'!i)) m2 m2'
  by auto
have Rpp': stepResultsinR p p' R
proof −
{
  fix c c'
  assume step1: ⟨V'!i,m1⟩ → ◁α▷ ⟨Some c,m2⟩
  assume step2: ⟨V'!i,m1⟩ → ◁α'▷ ⟨Some c',m2'⟩
  assume inR'-res: ([c],[c']) ∈ R'

from PPc-Vs-at-i step1 step2 PPsc-of-step
have set (PPc c) ⊆ set (PPV V) ∧ set (PPc c') ⊆ set (PPV V)
  by (metis (no-types) the.simps xt1(6))

  with inR'-res Rdef have ([c],[c']) ∈ R
  by auto
}
thus ?thesis
  by (metis step stepResultsinR-def stepreq)
qed

have Rαα': (α,α') ∈ R
proof −
from PPc-Vs-at-i step stepreq PPsc-of-step have
  set (PPV α) ⊆ set (PPV V) ∧ set (PPV α') ⊆ set (PPV V)
  by (metis (no-types) xt1(6))
with stepreq Rdef show ?thesis
  by auto
qed

from stepreq Rpp' Rαα' show
  ∃ p' α' m2'. ⟨V'!i,m1⟩ → ◁α'▷ ⟨p',m2'⟩ ∧
  stepResultsinR p p' R ∧ (α,α') ∈ R ∧
  dhequality-alternative d PP (pp (V'!i)) m2 m2'
  by auto
qed

```

**theorem** parallel-composition:  
 $\llbracket \forall i < \text{length } V. \text{WHATWHERE-Secure } [V!i]; \text{unique-PPV } V \rrbracket$   
 $\implies \text{WHATWHERE-Secure } V$   
**proof** (simp add: WHATWHERE-Secure-def, induct V, auto)  
 fix d PP  
**from** WHATWHERE-empty

```

show  $\exists R. SdlHPPB d PP R \wedge (\[],[]) \in R$ 
    by (simp add: WHATWHERE-Secure-def)
next
    fix  $c V d PP$ 
    assume  $IH: \llbracket \forall i < length V.$ 
         $\forall d PP. \exists R. SdlHPPB d PP R \wedge ([V!i],[V!i]) \in R;$ 
         $unique\text{-}PPV V \rrbracket$ 
         $\implies \forall d PP. \exists R. SdlHPPB d PP R \wedge (V,V) \in R$ 
    assume  $ISassump: \forall i < Suc (length V).$ 
         $\forall d PP. \exists R. SdlHPPB d PP R \wedge([(c\# V)!i],[(c\# V)!i]) \in R$ 
    assume  $uniPPcV: unique\text{-}PPV (c\# V)$ 

    hence  $IHassump1: unique\text{-}PPV V$ 
        by (simp add: unique-PPV-def)

from  $uniPPcV$  have  $nocommonPP: set (PPc c) \cap set (PPV V) = \{ \}$ 
    by (simp add: unique-PPV-def)

from  $ISassump$  have  $IHassump2: \forall i < length V.$ 
     $\forall d PP. \exists R. SdlHPPB d PP R \wedge ([V!i],[V!i]) \in R$ 
    by auto

with  $IHassump1$   $IH$  obtain  $RV'$  where  $RV'assump:$ 
     $SdlHPPB d PP RV' \wedge (V,V) \in RV'$ 
    by blast

def  $RV \equiv \{(V',V''). (V',V'') \in RV' \wedge set (PPV V') \subseteq set (PPV V) \wedge set (PPV V'') \subseteq set (PPV V)\}$ 

with  $RV'assump$   $RV\text{-}def SdlHPPB\text{-}restricted\text{-}on\text{-}PP\text{-}is\text{-}SdlHPPB$ 
have  $SdlHPPRV: SdlHPPB d PP RV$ 
    by force

from  $ISassump$  obtain  $Rc'$  where  $Rc'assump:$ 
     $SdlHPPB d PP Rc' \wedge ([c],[c]) \in Rc'$ 
    by (metis append-Nil drop-Nil neq0-conv not-Cons-self
        nth-append-length nth-drop' zero-less-Suc)

def  $Rc \equiv \{(V',V''). (V',V'') \in Rc' \wedge set (PPV V') \subseteq set (PPc c) \wedge set (PPV V'') \subseteq set (PPc c)\}$ 

with  $Rc'assump$   $Rc\text{-}def SdlHPPB\text{-}restricted\text{-}on\text{-}PP\text{-}is\text{-}SdlHPPB$ 
have  $SdlHPPRc: SdlHPPB d PP Rc$ 
    by force

from  $nocommonPP$  have  $Domain RV \cap Domain Rc \subseteq \{ \}$ 
    by (simp add:  $RV\text{-}def Rc\text{-}def$ , auto,
        metis Int-absorb2 Int-mono inf-commute inf-idem le-bot nocommonPP
        order-eq-refl unique-V-uneq)

```

```

with commonAreft-subset-commonDomain
have Areftassump1: Areft RV ∩ Areft Rc ⊆ {[]}
    by force

def R ≡ {(V', V''). ∃ c c' W W'. V' = c#W ∧ V'' = c'#W' ∧ W ≠ []
    ∧ W' ≠ [] ∧ ([c],[c']) ∈ Rc ∧ (W,W') ∈ RV}

with RV-def RV'assump Rc-def Rc'assump have inR:
    V ≠ [] ⟹ (c#V,c#V) ∈ R
    by auto

from R-def Rc-def RV-def nocommonPP
have Domain R ∩ Domain (Rc ∪ RV) = {}
    by (simp add: R-def Rc-def RV-def, auto,
          metis inf-bot-right le-inf-iff subset-empty unique-V-uneq,
          metis (hide-lams, no-types) inf-absorb1 inf-bot-right le-inf-iff unique-c-uneq)

with commonAreft-subset-commonDomain
have Areftassump2: Areft R ∩ Areft (Rc ∪ RV) ⊆ {[]}
    by force

have disjuptoR:
    disj-dlHPP-Bisimulation-Up-To-R' d PP (Rc ∪ RV) R
proof (simp add: disj-dlHPP-Bisimulation-Up-To-R'-def, auto)
    from Areftassump1 SdlHPPRc SdlHPPRV Union-Strong-dlHPP-Bisim
    show SdlHPPB d PP (Rc ∪ RV)
    by force
next
    from SdlHPPRV have symRV: sym RV
    by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def)
    from SdlHPPRc have symRc: sym Rc
    by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def)
    with symRV R-def show sym R
    by (simp add: sym-def, auto)
next
    from SdlHPPRV have transRV: trans RV
    by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def)
    from SdlHPPRc have transRc: trans Rc
    by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def)
    show trans R
    proof -
        {
            fix V V' V''
            assume p1: (V,V') ∈ R
            assume p2: (V',V'') ∈ R
            have (V,V'') ∈ R
            proof -
                from p1 R-def obtain c c' W W' where p1assump:

```

```

 $V = c \# W \wedge V' = c' \# W' \wedge W \neq [] \wedge W' \neq [] \wedge$ 
 $([c],[c']) \in Rc \wedge (W,W') \in RV$ 
by auto
with p2 R-def obtain c'' W'' where p2assump:
 $V'' = c'' \# W'' \wedge W'' \neq [] \wedge$ 
 $([c'],[c'']) \in Rc \wedge (W',W'') \in RV$ 
by auto
with p1assump transRc transRV have
trans-assump:  $([c],[c'']) \in Rc \wedge (W,W'') \in RV$ 
by (simp add: trans-def, blast)
with p1assump p2assump R-def show ?thesis
by auto
qed
}
thus ?thesis unfolding trans-def by blast
qed
next
fix V V'
assume  $(V,V') \in R$ 
with R-def SdlHPPRV show length V = length V'
by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def, auto)
next
fix V V' i
assume inR:  $(V,V') \in R$ 
assume irange:  $i < \text{length } V$ 
assume notIDC:  $\neg IDC d (V!i)$ 
 $(htchLoc (pp (V!i)))$ 
from inR R-def obtain c c' W W' where VV'assump:
 $V = c \# W \wedge V' = c' \# W' \wedge W \neq [] \wedge W' \neq [] \wedge$ 
 $([c],[c']) \in Rc \wedge (W,W') \in RV$ 
by auto
— Case separation for i
from VV'assump SdlHPPRc have Case-i0:
 $i = 0 \implies (NDC d (V!i) \vee$ 
 $IDC d (V!i) (htchLoc (pp (V!i))))$ 
by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def, auto)

from VV'assump SdlHPPRV have  $\forall i < \text{length } W.$ 
 $(NDC d (W!i) \vee$ 
 $IDC d (W!i) (htchLoc (pp (W!i))))$ 
by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def, auto)

with irange VV'assump have Case-in0:
 $i > 0 \implies (NDC d (V!i) \vee$ 
 $IDC d (V!i) (htchLoc (pp (V!i))))$ 
by simp
from notIDC Case-i0 Case-in0
show NDC d (V!i)
by auto

```

```

next
  fix  $V V' m1 m1' m2 \alpha p i$ 
  assume  $inR: (V, V') \in R$ 
  assume  $irange: i < length V$ 
  assume  $step: \langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m2 \rangle$ 
  assume  $dhequal: m1 \sim_{d, (htchLocSet PP)} m1'$ 

  from  $inR R\text{-def obtain } c c' W W' \text{ where } VV'\text{assump}:$ 
     $V = c \# W \wedge V' = c' \# W' \wedge W \neq [] \wedge W' \neq [] \wedge$ 
     $([c], [c']) \in Rc \wedge (W, W') \in RV$ 
    by auto
    — Case separation for i
    from  $VV'\text{assump } SdlHPPRc \text{ strongdlHPPB-aux}[of d PP$ 
       $Rc 0 [c] [c']] step dhequal$ 
    have Case-i0:
       $i = 0 \implies \exists p' \alpha' m2'.$ 
       $\langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p', m2' \rangle \wedge$ 
       $stepResultsinR p p' (R \cup (Rc \cup RV)) \wedge$ 
       $((\alpha, \alpha') \in R \vee (\alpha, \alpha') \in Rc \vee (\alpha, \alpha') \in RV) \wedge$ 
       $dhequality-alternative d PP (pp (V!i)) m2 m2'$ 
      by (simp add: stepResultsinR-def, blast)

    from  $step VV'\text{assump irange have rewV}:$ 
       $i > 0 \implies (i - Suc 0) < length W \wedge V!i = W!(i - Suc 0)$ 
      by simp

    with  $irange VV'\text{assump step dhequal SdlHPPRV}$ 
       $strongdlHPPB\text{-aux}[of d PP RV - W W']$ 
    have Case-in0:
       $i > 0 \implies \exists p' \alpha' m2'.$ 
       $\langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p', m2' \rangle \wedge$ 
       $stepResultsinR p p' (R \cup (Rc \cup RV)) \wedge$ 
       $((\alpha, \alpha') \in R \vee (\alpha, \alpha') \in Rc \vee (\alpha, \alpha') \in RV) \wedge$ 
       $dhequality-alternative d PP (pp (V!i)) m2 m2'$ 
      by (simp add: stepResultsinR-def, blast)

    from Case-i0 Case-in0
    show  $\exists p' \alpha' m2'.$ 
       $\langle V!i, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p', m2' \rangle \wedge$ 
       $stepResultsinR p p' (R \cup (Rc \cup RV)) \wedge$ 
       $((\alpha, \alpha') \in R \vee (\alpha, \alpha') \in Rc \vee (\alpha, \alpha') \in RV) \wedge$ 
       $dhequality-alternative d PP (pp (V!i)) m2 m2'$ 
      by auto
    qed

    with Areflassump2 Rc'assump Up-To-Technique
    show  $\exists R. SdlHPPB d PP R \wedge (c \# V, c \# V) \in R$ 
      by (metis UnCI inR)

qed

```

```

end

end
```

### 3 Example language and compositionality proofs

#### 3.1 Example language with dynamic thread creation

As in [2], we instantiate the language with a simple while language that supports dynamic thread creation via a spawn command (Multi-threaded While Language with spawn, MWLs). Note that the language is still parametric in the language used for Boolean and arithmetic expressions ('exp).

```

theory MWLs
imports .. /Strong-Security /Types
begin

— type parameters not instantiated:
— 'exp: expressions (arithmetic, boolean...)
— 'val: numbers, boolean constants....
— 'id: identifier names

— SYNTAX

datatype ('exp, 'id) MWLsCom
= Skip nat (skip_ [50] 70)
| Assign 'id nat 'exp
  (-:= - [70,50,70] 70)

| Seq ('exp, 'id) MWLsCom
  ('exp, 'id) MWLsCom
  (-;- [61,60] 60)

| If-Else nat 'exp ('exp, 'id) MWLsCom
  ('exp, 'id) MWLsCom
  (if_ - then - else - fi [50,80,79,79] 70)

| While-Do nat 'exp ('exp, 'id) MWLsCom
  (while_ - do - od [50,80,79] 70)

| Spawn nat (('exp, 'id) MWLsCom) list
  (spawn_ - [50,70] 70)

— function for obtaining the program point of some MWLsloc command
primrec pp ::('exp, 'id) MWLsCom ⇒ nat
where
```

```

 $pp (skip_{\iota}) = \iota |$ 
 $pp (x :=_{\iota} e) = \iota |$ 
 $pp (c1;c2) = pp\ c1 |$ 
 $pp (\text{if}_{\iota}\ b\ \text{then}\ c1\ \text{else}\ c2\ \text{fi}) = \iota |$ 
 $pp (\text{while}_{\iota}\ b\ \text{do}\ c\ \text{od}) = \iota |$ 
 $pp (\text{spawn}_{\iota}\ V) = \iota$ 

```

— mutually recursive functions to collect program points of commands and thread pools

```

primrec  $PPc :: ('exp, 'id) MWLsCom \Rightarrow nat\ list$ 
and  $PPV :: ('exp, 'id) MWLsCom\ list \Rightarrow nat\ list$ 
where
 $PPc (skip_{\iota}) = [\iota] |$ 
 $PPc (x :=_{\iota} e) = [\iota] |$ 
 $PPc (c1;c2) = (PPc\ c1) @ (PPc\ c2) |$ 
 $PPc (\text{if}_{\iota}\ b\ \text{then}\ c1\ \text{else}\ c2\ \text{fi}) = [\iota] @ (PPc\ c1) @ (PPc\ c2) |$ 
 $PPc (\text{while}_{\iota}\ b\ \text{do}\ c\ \text{od}) = [\iota] @ (PPc\ c) |$ 
 $PPc (\text{spawn}_{\iota}\ V) = [\iota] @ (PPV\ V) |$ 

 $PPV [] = [] |$ 
 $PPV (c \# V) = (PPc\ c) @ (PPV\ V)$ 

```

— predicate indicating that a command only contains unique program points

```

definition  $unique-PPc :: ('exp, 'id) MWLsCom \Rightarrow bool$ 
where
 $unique-PPc\ c = distinct\ (PPc\ c)$ 

```

— predicate indicating that a thread pool only contains unique program points

```

definition  $unique-PPV :: ('exp, 'id) MWLsCom\ list \Rightarrow bool$ 
where
 $unique-PPV\ V = distinct\ (PPV\ V)$ 

```

```

lemma  $PPc\text{-nonempty}: PPc\ c \neq []$ 
by (induct, simp-all)

```

```

lemma  $unique-c\text{-uneq}: set\ (PPc\ c) \cap set\ (PPc\ c') = \{\} \implies c \neq c'$ 
by (insert PPc-nonempty, force)

```

```

lemma  $V\text{-nonempty-PPV\ -nonempty}: V \neq [] \implies PPV\ V \neq []$ 
by (auto, induct V, simp-all, insert PPc-nonempty, force)

```

```

lemma  $unique-V\text{-uneq}:$ 
 $\llbracket V \neq []; V' \neq []; set\ (PPV\ V) \cap set\ (PPV\ V') = \{\} \rrbracket \implies V \neq V'$ 
by (auto, induct V, simp-all, insert V-nonempty-PPV-nonempty, auto)

```

```

lemma  $PPc\text{-in-PPV}: c \in set\ V \implies set\ (PPc\ c) \subseteq set\ (PPV\ V)$ 
by (induct V, auto)

```

```

lemma  $listindices\text{-aux}: i < length\ V \implies (V!i) \in set\ V$ 

```

**by** (*metis nth-mem*)

**lemma** *PPc-in-PPV-version*:

$i < \text{length } V \implies \text{set}(\text{PPc}(V!i)) \subseteq \text{set}(\text{PPV } V)$   
**by** (*rule PPc-in-PPV, erule listindices-aux*)

**lemma** *uniPPV-uniPPc: unique-PPV V*  $\implies (\forall i < \text{length } V. \text{unique-PPc}(V!i))$

**by** (*auto, simp add: unique-PPV-def, induct V,*  
*auto simp add: unique-PPc-def,*  
*metis in-set-conv-nth length-Suc-conv set-ConsD*)

— SEMANTICS

**locale** *MWLs-semantics* =  
**fixes** *E* :: ('exp, 'id, 'val) *Evalfunction*  
**and** *BMap* :: 'val  $\Rightarrow$  bool  
**begin**

— steps semantics, set of deterministic steps from commands to program states  
**inductive-set**

*MWLsSteps-det* ::  
('exp, 'id, 'val, ('exp, 'id) *MWLsCom*) *TLSteps*  
**and** *MWLslocSteps-det'* ::  
('exp, 'id, 'val, ('exp, 'id) *MWLsCom*) *TLSteps-curry*  
 $((1\langle\cdot,\cdot\rangle) \rightarrow \triangleleft\alpha\triangleright / (1\langle\cdot,\cdot\rangle) [0,0,0,0,0] 81)$

**where**

$\langle c1, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft\alpha\triangleright \langle c2, m2 \rangle \equiv ((c1, m1), \alpha, (c2, m2)) \in \text{MWLsSteps-det} \mid$   
skip:  $\langle \text{skip}_t, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft\alpha\triangleright \langle \text{None}, m \rangle \mid$

assign:  $(E e m) = v \implies$   
 $\langle x :=_t e, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft\alpha\triangleright \langle \text{None}, m(x := v) \rangle \mid$

seq1:  $\langle c1, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft\alpha\triangleright \langle \text{None}, m' \rangle \implies$   
 $\langle c1; c2, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft\alpha\triangleright \langle \text{Some } c2, m' \rangle \mid$

seq2:  $\langle c1, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft\alpha\triangleright \langle \text{Some } c1', m' \rangle \implies$   
 $\langle c1; c2, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft\alpha\triangleright \langle \text{Some } (c1'; c2), m' \rangle \mid$

iftrue:  $\text{BMap}(E b m) = \text{True} \implies$   
 $\langle \text{if}_t b \text{ then } c1 \text{ else } c2 fi, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft\alpha\triangleright \langle \text{Some } c1, m \rangle \mid$

iffalse:  $\text{BMap}(E b m) = \text{False} \implies$   
 $\langle \text{if}_t b \text{ then } c1 \text{ else } c2 fi, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft\alpha\triangleright \langle \text{Some } c2, m \rangle \mid$

whiletrue:  $\text{BMap}(E b m) = \text{True} \implies$   
 $\langle \text{while}_t b \text{ do } c od, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft\alpha\triangleright \langle \text{Some } (c; (\text{while}_t b \text{ do } c od)), m \rangle \mid$

whilefalse:  $\text{BMap}(E b m) = \text{False} \implies$   
 $\langle \text{while}_t b \text{ do } c od, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft\alpha\triangleright \langle \text{None}, m \rangle \mid$

spawn:  $\langle \text{spawn}_t V, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft\alpha\triangleright \langle \text{None}, m \rangle$

**inductive-cases** *MWLsSteps-det-cases*:

$\langle \text{skip}_t, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft\alpha\triangleright \langle p, m' \rangle$   
 $\langle x :=_t e, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft\alpha\triangleright \langle p, m' \rangle$   
 $\langle c1; c2, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft\alpha\triangleright \langle p, m' \rangle$   
 $\langle \text{if}_t b \text{ then } c1 \text{ else } c2 fi, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft\alpha\triangleright \langle p, m' \rangle$

$\langle \text{while}_t b \text{ do } c \text{ od}, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m' \rangle$   
 $\langle \text{spawn}_t V, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m' \rangle$

— non-deterministic, possibilistic system step (added for intuition, not used in the proofs)

**inductive-set**

*MWLsSteps-ndet* ::  
 $('exp, 'id, 'val, ('exp, 'id) MWLsCom) TPSteps$   
**and** *MWLsSteps-ndet'* ::  
 $('exp, 'id, 'val, ('exp, 'id) MWLsCom) TPSteps-curry$   
 $((1\langle\langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle\rangle) \Rightarrow / (1\langle\langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle\rangle) [0, 0, 0, 0] 81)$   
**where**  
 $\langle V, m \rangle \Rightarrow \langle V', m' \rangle \equiv ((V, m), (V', m')) \in MWLsSteps-ndet \mid$   
 $\text{stepthreadi1}: \langle ci, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle \text{None}, m' \rangle \Rightarrow$   
 $\langle cf @ [ci] @ ca, m \rangle \Rightarrow \langle cf @ \alpha @ ca, m' \rangle \mid$   
 $\text{stepthreadi2}: \langle ci, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle \text{Some } c', m' \rangle \Rightarrow$   
 $\langle cf @ [ci] @ ca, m \rangle \Rightarrow \langle cf @ [c'] @ \alpha @ ca, m \rangle$

— lemma about existence and uniqueness of next memory of a step

**lemma** *nextmem-exists-and-unique*:

$\exists m' p \alpha. \langle c, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m' \rangle$   
 $\wedge (\forall m''. (\exists p \alpha. \langle c, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m'' \rangle) \longrightarrow m'' = m')$   
**by** (*induct*, *auto*, *metis MWLsSteps-det.skip MWLsSteps-det-cases(1)*,  
*metis MWLsSteps-det-cases(2) MWLsSteps-det.assign*,  
*metis (no-types) MWLsSteps-det.seq1 MWLsSteps-det.seq2*  
*MWLsSteps-det-cases(3) not-Some-eq*,  
*metis MWLsSteps-det.iffalse MWLsSteps-det.iftrue*  
*MWLsSteps-det-cases(4)*,  
*metis MWLsSteps-det.whilefalse MWLsSteps-det.whiletrue*  
*MWLsSteps-det-cases(5)*,  
*metis MWLsSteps-det.spawn MWLsSteps-det-cases(6))*

**lemma** *PPsc-of-step*:

$\llbracket \langle c, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m' \rangle; \exists c'. p = \text{Some } c' \rrbracket$   
 $\implies \text{set}(PPc(\text{the } p)) \subseteq \text{set}(PPc c)$   
**by** (*induct rule: MWLsSteps-det.induct*, *auto*)

**lemma** *PPsaα-of-step*:

$\langle c, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m' \rangle$   
 $\implies \text{set}(PPV \alpha) \subseteq \text{set}(PPc c)$   
**by** (*induct rule: MWLsSteps-det.induct*, *auto*)

**end**

**end**

### 3.2 Proofs of atomic compositionality results

We prove for each atomic command of our example programming language (i.e. a command that is not composed out of other commands) that it is strongly secure if the expressions involved are indistinguishable for an observer on security level  $d$ .

```

theory WHATWHERE-Secure-Skip-Assign
imports Parallel-Composition
begin

context WHATWHERE-Secure-Programs
begin

abbreviation NextMem'
(⟦-⟧'(-'))
where
⟦c⟧(m) ≡ NextMem c m

— define when two expressions are indistinguishable with respect to a domain d
definition d-indistinguishable :: 'd::order ⇒ 'exp ⇒ 'exp ⇒ bool
where
d-indistinguishable d e1 e2 ≡ ∀ m m'. ((m =d m') → ((E e1 m) = (E e2 m')))

abbreviation d-indistinguishable' :: 'exp ⇒ 'd::order ⇒ 'exp ⇒ bool
( (- ≡- -) )
where
e1 ≡d e2 ≡ d-indistinguishable d e1 e2

— symmetry of d-indistinguishable
lemma d-indistinguishable-sym:
e ≡d e' ⇒ e' ≡d e
by (simp add: d-indistinguishable-def d-equal-def, metis)

— transitivity of d-indistinguishable
lemma d-indistinguishable-trans:
⟦ e ≡d e'; e' ≡d e'' ⟧ ⇒ e ≡d e''
by (simp add: d-indistinguishable-def d-equal-def, metis)

— predicate for dH-indistinguishable
definition dH-indistinguishable :: 'd ⇒ ('d, 'exp) Hatches
⇒ 'exp ⇒ 'exp ⇒ bool
where
dH-indistinguishable d H e1 e2 ≡ (∀ m m'. m ~d,H m')
→ (E e1 m = E e2 m')

abbreviation dH-indistinguishable' :: 'exp ⇒ 'd

```

```

 $\Rightarrow ('d, 'exp) Hatches \Rightarrow 'exp \Rightarrow bool$ 
 $(\ (- \equiv_{-, -} \ -) \ )$ 
where
 $e1 \equiv_{d,H} e2 \equiv dH\text{-indistinguishable } d H e1 e2$ 

lemma empH-implies-dHindistinguishable-eq-dindistinguishable:
 $(e \equiv_{d,\{\}} e') = (e \equiv_d e')$ 
by (simp add: d-indistinguishable-def dH-indistinguishable-def
dH-equal-def d-equal-def)

theorem WHATWHERE-Secure-Skip:
WHATWHERE-Secure [skipt]
proof (simp add: WHATWHERE-Secure-def, auto)
fix  $d PP$ 
def  $R \equiv \{(V::('exp,'id) MWLsCom list, V'::('exp,'id) MWLsCom list).$ 
 $V = V' \wedge (V = [] \vee V = [skip_t])\}$ 

have inR:  $([skip_t],[skip_t]) \in R$ 
by (simp add: R-def)

have SdlHPPB d PP R
proof (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def R-def sym-def trans-def
NDC-def NextMem-def, auto)
fix  $m1 m1'$ 
assume dequal:  $m1 =_d m1'$ 
have nextm1:  $(THE m2. (\exists p \alpha. \langle skip_t, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m2 \rangle)) = m1$ 
by (insert MWLsSteps-det.simps[of skipt m1], force)

have nextm1':
 $(THE m2'. (\exists p \alpha. \langle skip_t, m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m2' \rangle)) = m1'$ 
by (insert MWLsSteps-det.simps[of skipt m1'], force)

with dequal nextm1 show
 $THE m2. \exists p \alpha. \langle skip_t, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m2 \rangle =_d$ 
 $THE m2'. \exists p \alpha. \langle skip_t, m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m2' \rangle$ 
by auto

next
fix  $p m1 m1' m2 \alpha$ 
assume dequal:  $m1 \sim_{d,(htchLocSet PP)} m1'$ 
assume skipstep:  $\langle skip_t, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m2 \rangle$ 
with MWLsSteps-det.simps[of skipt m1 \alpha p m2]
have aux:  $p = None \wedge m2 = m1 \wedge \alpha = []$ 
by auto
with dequal skipstep MWLsSteps-det.skip
show  $\exists p' m2'. \langle skip_t, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p', m2' \rangle \wedge$ 
 $\langle skip_t, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p', m2' \rangle$ 

```

```

stepResultsinR p p' {(V, V'). V = V' ∧
(V = [] ∨ V = [skipt])} ∧
(α = [] ∨ α = [skipt]) ∧
dhequality-alternative d PP t m2 m2'
by (simp add: stepResultsinR-def dhequality-alternative-def,
fastforce)
qed

with inR show ∃ R. SdlHPPB d PP R ∧ ([skipt],[skipt]) ∈ R
by auto
qed

```

— auxiliary lemma for assign side condition (lemma 9 in original paper)  
**lemma semAssignSC-aux:**

```

assumes dhind: e ≡DA x,(htchLoc t) e
shows NDC d (x :=t e) ∨ IDC d (x :=t e) (htchLoc (pp (x :=t e)))
proof (simp add: IDC-def, auto, simp add: NDC-def)
fix m1 m1'
assume dhequal: m1 ~d,htchLoc t m1'
hence dequal: m1 =d m1'
by (simp add: dH-equal-def)

obtain v where veq: E e m1 = v by auto
hence m2eq: [x :=t e](m1) = m1(x := v)
by (simp add: NextMem-def,
insert MWLsSteps-det.simps[of x :=t e m1],
force)

obtain v' where v'eq: E e m1' = v' by auto
hence m2'eq: [x :=t e](m1') = m1'(x := v')
by (simp add: NextMem-def,
insert MWLsSteps-det.simps[of x :=t e m1'],
force)

from dhequal have shiftdomain:
DA x ≤ d ==> m1 ~DA x,(htchLoc t) m1'
by (simp add: dH-equal-def d-equal-def htchLoc-def)

with veq v'eq dhind
have (DA x) ≤ d ==> v = v'
by (simp add: dH-indistinguishable-def)

with dequal m2eq m2'eq
show [x :=t e](m1) =d [x :=t e](m1')
by (simp add: d-equal-def)
qed

```

```

theorem WHATWHERE-Secure-Assign:
  assumes dhind:  $e \equiv_{DA} x,(\text{htchLoc } \iota) e$ 
  assumes dheq-imp:  $\forall m m' d \iota'. (m \sim_{d,(\text{htchLoc } \iota')} m' \wedge$ 
     $\llbracket x :=_t e \rrbracket(m) =_d \llbracket x :=_t e \rrbracket(m'))$ 
     $\rightarrow \llbracket x :=_t e \rrbracket(m) \sim_{d,(\text{htchLoc } \iota')} \llbracket x :=_t e \rrbracket(m')$ 
  shows WHATWHERE-Secure  $[x :=_t e]$ 
  proof (simp add: WHATWHERE-Secure-def, auto)
    fix d PP
    def R  $\equiv \{(V::('exp,'id) MWLsCom list, V'::('exp,'id) MWLsCom list).$ 
       $V = V' \wedge (V = [] \vee V = [x :=_t e])\}$ 

    have inR:  $([x :=_t e], [x :=_t e]) \in R$ 
    by (simp add: R-def)

    have SdlHPPB d PP R
    proof (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def R-def
      sym-def trans-def, auto)
      assume notIDC:  $\neg IDC d (x :=_t e) (\text{htchLoc } \iota)$ 
      with dhind semAssignSC-aux
      show NDC d  $(x :=_t e)$ 
      by force
    next
      fix m1 m1' m2 p α
      assume assignstep:  $\langle x :=_t e, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m2 \rangle$ 
      assume dhequal:  $m1 \sim_{d, \text{htchLocSet}} m1'$ 

      from assignstep have nextm1:
        p = None  $\wedge \alpha = [] \wedge \llbracket x :=_t e \rrbracket(m1) = m2$ 
        by (simp add: NextMem-def,
          insert MWLsSteps-det.simps[of x :=_t e m1], force)

      obtain m2' where nextm1':
         $\langle x :=_t e, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft [] \triangleright \langle \text{None}, m2' \rangle \wedge \llbracket x :=_t e \rrbracket(m1') = m2'$ 
        by (simp add: NextMem-def,
          insert MWLsSteps-det.simps[of x :=_t e m1'], force)

      from dhequal have dhequal-ι:  $\bigwedge \iota. \text{htchLoc } \iota \subseteq \text{htchLocSet } PP$ 
         $\implies m1 \sim_{d,(\text{htchLoc } \iota)} m1'$ 
        by (simp add: dH-equal-def, auto)

      with dhind semAssignSC-aux
      have htchLoc ι ⊆ htchLocSet PP  $\implies$ 
         $\llbracket x :=_t e \rrbracket(m1) =_d \llbracket x :=_t e \rrbracket(m1')$ 
        by (simp add: NDC-def IDC-def dH-equal-def, fastforce)

      with dhind dheq-imp dhequal-ι
      have htchLoc ι ⊆ htchLocSet PP  $\implies$ 
         $\llbracket x :=_t e \rrbracket(m1) \sim_{d,(\text{htchLocSet } PP)} \llbracket x :=_t e \rrbracket(m1')$ 

```

```

by (simp add: htchLocSet-def dH-equal-def, blast)

with nextm1 nextm1' assignstep dhequal
show ∃ p' m2'.
  ⟨x :=τ e, m1'⟩ →α ⟨p', m2'⟩ ∧
  stepResultsinR p p' {(V, V'). V = V' ∧ (V = [] ∨ V = [x :=τ e])} ∧
  (α = [] ∨ α = [x :=τ e]) ∧ dhequality-alternative d PP τ m2 m2'
    by (auto simp add: stepResultsinR-def dhequality-alternative-def)
qed

with inR show ∃ R. SdlHPPB d PP R ∧ ([x :=τ e], [x :=τ e]) ∈ R
  by auto
qed

end

end

```

### 3.3 Proofs of non-atomic compositionality results

We prove compositionality results for each non-atomic command of our example programming language (i.e. a command that is composed out of other commands): If the components are strongly secure and the expressions involved indistinguishable for an observer on security level  $d$ , then the composed command is also strongly secure.

```

theory Language-Composition
imports WHATWHERE-Secure-Skip-Assign
begin

context WHATWHERE-Secure-Programs
begin

theorem Compositionality-Seq:
assumes WWs-part1: WHATWHERE-Secure [c1]
assumes WWs-part2: WHATWHERE-Secure [c2]
assumes uniPPc1c2: unique-PPc (c1;c2)
shows WHATWHERE-Secure [c1;c2]
proof (simp add: WHATWHERE-Secure-def, auto)
fix d PP

from uniPPc1c2 have nocommonPP: set (PPc c1) ∩ set (PPc c2) = {}
  by (simp add: unique-PPV-def unique-PPc-def)

from WWs-part1 obtain R1' where R1'assump:
  SdlHPPB d PP R1' ∧ ([c1],[c1]) ∈ R1'
  by (simp add: WHATWHERE-Secure-def, auto)

```

```

def R1 ≡ {(V,V'). (V,V') ∈ R1' ∧ set (PPV V) ⊆ set (PPc c1)
    ∧ set (PPV V') ⊆ set (PPc c1)}

from R1'assump R1-def SdlHPPB-restricted-on-PP-is-SdlHPPB
have SdlHPPR1: SdlHPPB d PP R1
    by force

from WWs-part2 obtain R2' where R2'assump:
    SdlHPPB d PP R2' ∧ ([c2],[c2]) ∈ R2'
    by (simp add: WHATWHERE-Secure-def, auto)

def R2 ≡ {(V,V'). (V,V') ∈ R2' ∧ set (PPV V) ⊆ set (PPc c2)
    ∧ set (PPV V') ⊆ set (PPc c2)}

from R2'assump R2-def SdlHPPB-restricted-on-PP-is-SdlHPPB
have SdlHPPR2: SdlHPPB d PP R2
    by force

from nocomonPP have nocomonDomain: Domain R1 ∩ Domain R2 ⊆ {[]}
    by (simp add: R1-def R2-def, auto,
        metis inf-greatest inf-idem le-bot unique-V-uneq)

with commonArefl-subset-commonDomain
have AreflAssump1: Arefl R1 ∩ Arefl R2 ⊆ {[]}
    by force

def R0 ≡ {(s1,s2). ∃ c1 c1' c2 c2'. s1 = [c1;c2] ∧ s2 = [c1';c2'] ∧
    ([c1],[c1']) ∈ R1 ∧ ([c2],[c2']) ∈ R2}

with R1-def R1'assump R2-def R2'assump
have inR0: ([c1;c2],[c1;c2]) ∈ R0
    by auto

have Domain R0 ∩ Domain (R1 ∪ R2) = {}
    by (simp add: R0-def R1-def R2-def, auto, metis Int-absorb1 Int-assoc Int-empty-left
        nocomonPP unique-c-uneq, metis Int-absorb Int-absorb1
        Int-assoc Int-empty-left nocomonPP unique-c-uneq)

with commonArefl-subset-commonDomain
have AreflAssump2: Arefl R0 ∩ Arefl (R1 ∪ R2) ⊆ {[]}
    by force

have disjuptoR0:
    disj-dlHPP-Bisimulation-Up-To-R' d PP (R1 ∪ R2) R0
proof (simp add: disj-dlHPP-Bisimulation-Up-To-R'-def, auto)
    from AreflAssump1 SdlHPPR1 SdlHPPR2 Union-Strong-dlHPP-Bisim
    show SdlHPPB d PP (R1 ∪ R2)

```

```

    by metis
next
from SdlHPPR1 have symR1: sym R1
  by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def)
from SdlHPPR2 have symR2: sym R2
  by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def)
with symR1 R0-def show sym R0
  by (simp add: sym-def, auto)
next
from SdlHPPR1 have transR1: trans R1
  by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def)
from SdlHPPR2 have transR2: trans R2
  by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def)
show trans R0
proof -
{
fix V V' V"
assume p1: (V,V') ∈ R0
assume p2: (V',V") ∈ R0
have (V,V") ∈ R0
proof -
from p1 R0-def obtain c1 c2 c1' c2' where p1assump:
  V = [c1;c2] ∧ V' = [c1';c2'] ∧
  ([c1],[c1']) ∈ R1 ∧ ([c2],[c2']) ∈ R2
  by auto
with p2 R0-def obtain c1'' c2'' where p2assump:
  V'' = [c1'';c2''] ∧
  ([c1''],[c1''']) ∈ R1 ∧ ([c2''],[c2''']) ∈ R2
  by auto
with p1assump transR1 transR2 have
  trans-assump: ([c1],[c1'']) ∈ R1 ∧ ([c2],[c2'']) ∈ R2
  by (simp add: trans-def, blast)
with p1assump p2assump R0-def show ?thesis
  by auto
qed
}
thus ?thesis unfolding trans-def by blast
qed
next
fix V V'
assume (V,V') ∈ R0
with R0-def show length V = length V'
  by auto
next
fix V V' i
assume inR0: (V,V') ∈ R0
assume irange: i < length V
assume notIDC: ¬ IDC d (V!i) (htchLoc (pp (V!i)))
from inR0 R0-def obtain c1 c2 c1' c2' where VV'assump:

```

```

 $V = [c1;c2] \wedge V' = [c1';c2'] \wedge$ 
 $([c1],[c1']) \in R1 \wedge ([c2],[c2']) \in R2$ 
by auto
have eqnextmem:  $\bigwedge m. \llbracket c1;c2 \rrbracket(m) = \llbracket c1 \rrbracket(m)$ 
proof -
  fix m
  from nextmem-exists-and-unique obtain  $m'$  where  $c1nextmem:$ 
     $\exists p \alpha. \langle c1,m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p,m' \rangle$ 
     $\wedge (\forall m''. (\exists p \alpha. \langle c1,m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p,m'' \rangle) \longrightarrow m'' = m')$ 
  by force

  hence eqdir1:  $\llbracket c1 \rrbracket(m) = m'$ 
  by (simp add: NextMem-def, auto)

  from  $c1nextmem$  obtain  $p \alpha$  where  $\langle c1,m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p,m' \rangle$ 
  by auto

  with  $c1nextmem$  have  $\exists p \alpha. \langle c1;c2,m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p,m' \rangle$ 
   $\wedge (\forall m''. (\exists p \alpha. \langle c1;c2,m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p,m'' \rangle) \longrightarrow m'' = m')$ 
  by (auto, metis MWLsSteps-det.seq1 MWLsSteps-det.seq2
  option.exhaust, metis MWLsSteps-det-cases(3))

  hence eqdir2:  $\llbracket c1;c2 \rrbracket(m) = m'$ 
  by (simp add: NextMem-def, auto)

  with eqdir1 show  $\llbracket c1;c2 \rrbracket(m) = \llbracket c1 \rrbracket(m)$ 
  by auto
qed

have eqpp: pp (c1;c2) = pp c1
  by simp
from VV'assump SdlHPPR1 have IDC d c1 (htchLoc (pp c1))
   $\vee NDC d c1$ 
  by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def, auto)
with eqnextmem eqpp have IDC d (c1;c2)
  (htchLoc (pp (c1;c2)))  $\vee NDC d (c1;c2)$ 
  by (simp add: IDC-def NDC-def)
with inR0 irange notIDC VV'assump
show NDC d (V!i)
  by (simp add: IDC-def, auto)
next
  fix V V' m1 m1' m2  $\alpha$  p i
  assume inR0:  $(V,V') \in R0$ 
  assume irange:  $i < length V$ 
  assume step:  $\langle V!i,m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p,m2 \rangle$ 
  assume dhequal:  $m1 \sim_{d,htchLocSet PP} m1'$ 

  from inR0 R0-def obtain c1 c1' c2 c2' where R0pair:
   $V = [c1;c2] \wedge V' = [c1';c2'] \wedge ([c1],[c1']) \in R1$ 

```

$\wedge ([c2],[c2']) \in R\mathcal{Q}$   
**by auto**

**from**  $R0pair$  **irange** **have**  $i0: i = 0$  **by**  $simp$

**have**  $eqpp: pp(c1;c2) = pp c1$   
**by**  $simp$

— get the two different cases:

**from**  $R0pair$  **step**  $i0$  **obtain**  $c3$  **where** *case-distinction*:

$(p = Some c2 \wedge \langle c1, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle None, m2 \rangle)$   
 $\vee (p = Some (c3; c2) \wedge \langle c1, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle Some c3, m2 \rangle)$   
**by** ( $simp, insert MWLsSteps-det.simps[of c1;c2 m1],$   
 $auto$ )

**moreover**

— Case 1: first command terminates

{

**assume**  $passump: p = Some c2$   
**assume**  $StepAssump: \langle c1, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle None, m2 \rangle$   
**hence**  $Vstep-case1:$   
 $\langle c1; c2, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle Some c2, m2 \rangle$   
**by** ( $simp add: MWLsSteps-det.seq1$ )

**from**  $SdlHPPR1$  **StepAssump**  $R0pair$  **dhequal**

$strongdlHPPB-aux[of d PP$   
 $R1 0 [c1] [c1'] m1 \alpha None m2 m1']$

**obtain**  $p' \alpha' m2'$  **where**  $c1c1'$ **reason**:  
 $p' = None \wedge \langle c1', m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle p', m2' \rangle \wedge (\alpha, \alpha') \in R1 \wedge$   
*dhequality-alternative*  $d PP (pp c1) m2 m2'$   
**by** ( $simp add: stepResultsinR-def, fastforce$ )

**with**  $eqpp c1c1'$ **reason** **have**  $conclpart$ :

$\langle c1'; c2', m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle Some c2', m2' \rangle \wedge$   
*dhequality-alternative*  $d PP (pp (c1; c2)) m2 m2'$   
**by** ( $auto, simp add: MWLsSteps-det.seq1$ )

**with**  $passump R0pair c1c1'$ **reason**  $i0$

**have**  $case1-concl$ :

$\exists p' \alpha' m2'.$

$\langle V!i, m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle p', m2' \rangle \wedge$   
 $stepResultsinR p p' (R0 \cup (R1 \cup R2)) \wedge$   
 $((\alpha, \alpha') \in R0 \vee (\alpha, \alpha') \in R1 \vee (\alpha, \alpha') \in R2) \wedge$   
*dhequality-alternative*  $d PP (pp (V!i)) m2 m2'$   
**by** ( $simp add: stepResultsinR-def, auto$ )

}

**moreover**

— Case 2: first command does not terminate

{

**assume**  $passump: p = Some (c3; c2)$

```

assume StepAssump:  $\langle c1, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle \text{Some } c3, m2 \rangle$ 

hence Vstep-case2:  $\langle c1; c2, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle \text{Some } (c3; c2), m2 \rangle$ 
by (simp add: MWLsSteps-det.seq2)

from SdlHPPR1 StepAssump R0pair dhequal
  strongdlHPPB-aux[of d PP
    R1 0 [c1] [c1'] m1 α Some c3 m2 m1']
obtain p' c3' α' m2' where c1c1'reason:
  p' = Some c3' ∧ ⟨c1', m1'⟩ → △left α' △right ⟨p', m2'⟩ ∧
  ([c3], [c3']) ∈ R1 ∧ (α, α') ∈ R1 ∧
  dhequality-alternative d PP (pp c1) m2 m2'
by (simp add: stepResultsinR-def, fastforce)

with eqpp c1c1'reason have conclpart:
  ⟨c1'; c2', m1'⟩ → △left α' △right ⟨Some (c3'; c2'), m2'⟩ ∧
  dhequality-alternative d PP (pp (c1; c2)) m2 m2'
by (auto, simp add: MWLsSteps-det.seq2)

from c1c1'reason R0pair R0-def have
  ([c3; c2], [c3'; c2']) ∈ R0
by auto

with R0pair conclpart passump c1c1'reason i0
have case1-concl:
  ∃ p' α' m2'. ⟨V!i, m1'⟩ → △left α' △right ⟨p', m2'⟩ ∧
  stepResultsinR p p' (R0 ∪ (R1 ∪ R2)) ∧
  ((α, α') ∈ R0 ∨ (α, α') ∈ R1 ∨ (α, α') ∈ R2) ∧
  dhequality-alternative d PP (pp (V!i)) m2 m2'
by (simp add: stepResultsinR-def, auto)
}

ultimately
show ∃ p' α' m2'. ⟨V!i, m1'⟩ → △left α' △right ⟨p', m2'⟩ ∧
  stepResultsinR p p' (R0 ∪ (R1 ∪ R2)) ∧
  ((α, α') ∈ R0 ∨ (α, α') ∈ R1 ∨ (α, α') ∈ R2) ∧
  dhequality-alternative d PP (pp (V!i)) m2 m2'
by blast
qed

with inR0 Areflassump2 Up-To-Technique
have SdlHPPB d PP (R0 ∪ (R1 ∪ R2))
by auto

with inR0 show ∃ R. SdlHPPB d PP R ∧ ([c1; c2], [c1; c2]) ∈ R
by auto

qed

```

**theorem** *Compositionality-Spawn*:

```

assumes WWs-threads: WHATWHERE-Secure  $V$ 
assumes uniPPspawn: unique-PPc (spawnl  $V$ )
shows WHATWHERE-Secure [spawnl  $V$ ]
proof (simp add: WHATWHERE-Secure-def, auto)
  fix  $d$  PP

from uniPPspawn have pp-difference:  $\iota \notin \text{set}(\text{PPV } V)$ 
  by (simp add: unique-PPc-def)

— Step 1
from WWs-threads obtain  $R'$  where R'assump:
   $SdlHPPB d PP R' \wedge (V, V) \in R'$ 
  by (simp add: WHATWHERE-Secure-def, auto)

def  $R \equiv \{(V', V''). (V', V'') \in R' \wedge \text{set}(\text{PPV } V') \subseteq \text{set}(\text{PPV } V) \wedge \text{set}(\text{PPV } V'') \subseteq \text{set}(\text{PPV } V)\}$ 

from R'assump def SdlHPPB-restricted-on-PP-is-SdlHPPB
have SdlHPPR: SdlHPPB d PP R
  by force

— Step 2
def  $R0 \equiv \{(sp1, sp2). \exists \iota' \iota'' V' V''.$ 
   $sp1 = [\text{spawn}_{\iota'} V] \wedge sp2 = [\text{spawn}_{\iota''} V''] \wedge \iota' \notin \text{set}(\text{PPV } V) \wedge \iota'' \notin \text{set}(\text{PPV } V) \wedge (V', V'') \in R\}$ 

with R-def R'assump pp-difference have inR0:
   $([\text{spawn}_{\iota'} V], [\text{spawn}_{\iota''} V]) \in R0$ 
  by auto

— Step 3
from R0-def R-def R'assump have Domain R0 ∩ Domain R = {}
  by auto

with commonAreft-subset-commonDomain
have Areflassump: Areft R0 ∩ Areft R ⊆ {}
  by force

— Step 4
have disjuptoR0:
  disj-dlHPP-Bisimulation-Up-To-R' d PP R R0
proof (simp add: disj-dlHPP-Bisimulation-Up-To-R'-def, auto)
  from SdlHPPR show SdlHPPB d PP R
    by auto
next
from SdlHPPR have symR: sym R
  by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def)
with R0-def show sym R0

```

```

    by (simp add: sym-def, auto)
next
from SdlHPPR have transR: trans R
    by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def)
with R0-def show trans R0
proof -
{
fix V1 V2 V3
assume inR1: (V1, V2) ∈ R0
assume inR2: (V2, V3) ∈ R0
from inR1 R0-def obtain W W' i' where p1: V1 = [spawni' W]
    ∧ V2 = [spawni' W'] ∧ i' ∉ set (PPV V) ∧ i' ∉ set (PPV V)
    ∧ (W, W') ∈ R
    by auto
with inR2 R0-def obtain W'' i'' where p2: V3 = [spawni'' W'']
    ∧ i'' ∉ set (PPV V) ∧ (W', W'') ∈ R
    by auto
from p1 p2 transR have (W, W'') ∈ R
    by (simp add: trans-def, auto)
with p1 p2 R0-def have (V1, V3) ∈ R0
    by auto
}
thus ?thesis unfolding trans-def by blast
qed
next
fix V' V''
from SdlHPPR have eqlenR: (V', V'') ∈ R ⟹ length V' = length V''
    by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def, auto)
with R0-def show (V', V'') ∈ R0 ⟹ length V' = length V''
    by auto
next
fix V' V'' i
assume inR0: (V', V'') ∈ R0
assume irange: i < length V'
from inR0 R0-def obtain i' i'' W' W''
    where R0pair: V' = [spawni' W'] ∧ V'' = [spawni'' W'']
    by auto
{
fix m
from nextmem-exists-and-unique obtain m' where spawnnextmem:
    ∃p α. ⟨spawni' W', m⟩ → ⌜α⌝ ⟨p, m'⟩
    ∧ (∀m''. (∃p α. ⟨spawni' W', m⟩ → ⌜α⌝ ⟨p, m''⟩) → m'' = m')
    by force
hence m = m'
    by (metis MWLsSteps-det.spawn)
with spawnnextmem have eqnextmem:
    ⟦spawni' W⟧(m) = m

```

```

    by (simp add: NextMem-def, auto)
}

with R0pair irange show NDC d (V'!i)
  by (simp add: NDC-def)
next
fix V' V'' i m1 m1' m2 α p
assume inR0: (V', V'') ∈ R0
assume irange: i < length V'
assume step: ⟨V'!i, m1⟩ → ◊α▷ ⟨p, m2⟩
assume dhequal: m1 ~d,htchLocSet PP m1'

from inR0 R0-def obtain i' i'' W' W''
  where R0pair: V' = [spawni', W']
    ∧ V'' = [spawni'', W''] ∧ (W', W'') ∈ R
  by auto

with step irange
have conc-step1: α = W' ∧ p = None ∧ m2 = m1
  by (simp, metis MWLsSteps-det-cases(6))

from R0pair irange
obtain p' α' m2' where conc-step2: ⟨V'!i, m1⟩ → ◊α'▷ ⟨p', m2'⟩
  ∧ p' = None ∧ α' = W'' ∧ m2' = m1'
  by (simp, metis MWLsSteps-det.spawn)

with R0pair conc-step1 dhequal irange
show ∃ p' α' m2'. ⟨V'!i, m1⟩ → ◊α'▷ ⟨p', m2'⟩ ∧
  stepResultsinR p p' (R0 ∪ R) ∧
  ((α, α') ∈ R0 ∨ (α, α') ∈ R) ∧
  dhequality-alternative d PP (pp (V'!i)) m2 m2'
  by (simp add: stepResultsinR-def
    dhequality-alternative-def, auto)
qed
— Step 5
with Areflassump Up-To-Technique
have SdlHPPB d PP (R0 ∪ R)
  by auto

with inR0 show ∃ R. SdlHPPB d PP R ∧
  ([spawni V], [spawni V]) ∈ R
  by auto
qed

```

**theorem Compositionality-If:**  
**assumes** dind:  $\forall d. b \equiv_d b$   
**assumes** WWs-branch1: WHATWHERE-Secure [c1]  
**assumes** WWs-branch2: WHATWHERE-Secure [c2]

```

assumes uniPPif: unique-PPc (ift b then c1 else c2 fi)
shows WHATWHERE-Secure [ift b then c1 else c2 fi]
proof (simp add: WHATWHERE-Secure-def, auto)
fix d PP
from uniPPif have nocommonPP: set (PPc c1) ∩ set (PPc c2) = {}
by (simp add: unique-PPc-def)

from uniPPif have pp-difference: t ∉ set (PPc c1) ∪ set (PPc c2)
by (simp add: unique-PPc-def)

from WWs-branch1 obtain R1' where R1'assump:
SdlHPPB d PP R1' ∧ ([c1],[c1]) ∈ R1'
by (simp add: WHATWHERE-Secure-def, auto)

def R1 ≡ {(V,V'). (V,V') ∈ R1' ∧ set (PPV V) ⊆ set (PPc c1)
∧ set (PPV V') ⊆ set (PPc c1)}

from R1'assump R1-def SdlHPPB-restricted-on-PP-is-SdlHPPB
have SdlHPPR1: SdlHPPB d PP R1
by force

from WWs-branch2 obtain R2' where R2'assump:
SdlHPPB d PP R2' ∧ ([c2],[c2]) ∈ R2'
by (simp add: WHATWHERE-Secure-def, auto)

def R2 ≡ {(V,V'). (V,V') ∈ R2' ∧ set (PPV V) ⊆ set (PPc c2)
∧ set (PPV V') ⊆ set (PPc c2)}

from R2'assump R2-def SdlHPPB-restricted-on-PP-is-SdlHPPB
have SdlHPPR2: SdlHPPB d PP R2
by force

from nocommonPP have Domain R1 ∩ Domain R2 ⊆ {[]}

by (simp add: R1-def R2-def, auto,
metis empty-subsetI inf-idem inf-mono set-eq-subset unique-V-uneq)

with commonArefl-subset-commonDomain
have Areflassump1: Arefl R1 ∩ Arefl R2 ⊆ {[]}
by force

with SdlHPPR1 SdlHPPR2 Union-Strong-dlHPP-Bisim have SdlHPPR1R2:
SdlHPPB d PP (R1 ∪ R2)
by force

def R ≡ (R1 ∪ R2) ∪ {[[],[]]}

def R0 ≡ {(i1,i2). ∃ t' t'' b' b'' c1' c1'' c2' c2''. 
i1 = [ift' b' then c1' else c2' fi]

```

$\wedge i2 = [\text{if } \iota'' \text{ b'' then } c1'' \text{ else } c2'' \text{ fi}]$   
 $\wedge \iota' \notin (\text{set } (\text{PPc } c1) \cup \text{set } (\text{PPc } c2))$   
 $\wedge \iota'' \notin (\text{set } (\text{PPc } c1) \cup \text{set } (\text{PPc } c2)) \wedge ([c1'], [c1'']) \in R1$   
 $\wedge ([c2'], [c2'']) \in R2 \wedge b' \equiv_d b'']$

**with**  $R\text{-def } R1\text{-def } R1'\text{assump } R2\text{-def } R2'\text{assump pp-difference dind}$   
**have**  $\text{inR0: } ([\text{if } \iota \text{ b then } c1 \text{ else } c2 \text{ fi}], [\text{if } \iota \text{ b then } c1 \text{ else } c2 \text{ fi}]) \in R0$   
**by** *auto*

**from**  $R0\text{-def } R\text{-def } R1\text{-def } R2\text{-def}$   
**have**  $\text{Domain } R0 \cap \text{Domain } R = \{\}$   
**by** *auto*

**with** *commonAreft-subset-commonDomain*  
**have**  $\text{AreflAssump2: } \text{Arefl } R0 \cap \text{Arefl } R \subseteq \{\}$   
**by** *force*

**have**  $\text{disjuptoR0: }$   
*disj-dlHPP-Bisimulation-Up-To-R' d PP R R0*  
**proof** (*simp add: disj-dlHPP-Bisimulation-Up-To-R'-def, auto*)  
**from** *SdlHPPR1R2 adding-emptypair-keeps-SdlHPPB*  
**show** *SdlHPPB d PP R*  
**by** (*simp add: R-def*)

**next**  
**from** *SdlHPPR1 have symR1: sym R1*  
**by** (*simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def*)  
**from** *SdlHPPR2 have symR2: sym R2*  
**by** (*simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def*)  
**from** *symR1 symR2 d-indistinguishable-sym R0-def show sym R0*  
**by** (*simp add: sym-def, fastforce*)

**next**  
**from** *SdlHPPR1 have transR1: trans R1*  
**by** (*simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def*)  
**from** *SdlHPPR2 have transR2: trans R2*  
**by** (*simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def*)  
**show** *trans R0*  
**proof** –  
{  
**fix**  $V' V'' V'''$   
**assume**  $p1: (V', V'') \in R0$   
**assume**  $p2: (V'', V''') \in R0$

**from**  $p1 R0\text{-def obtain } \iota' \iota'' b' b'' c1' c1'' c2' c2'' \text{ where}$   
 $\text{passump1: } V' = [\text{if } \iota' \text{ b' then } c1' \text{ else } c2' \text{ fi}]$   
 $\wedge V'' = [\text{if } \iota'' \text{ b'' then } c1'' \text{ else } c2'' \text{ fi}]$   
 $\wedge \iota' \notin (\text{set } (\text{PPc } c1) \cup \text{set } (\text{PPc } c2))$   
 $\wedge \iota'' \notin (\text{set } (\text{PPc } c1) \cup \text{set } (\text{PPc } c2))$   
 $\wedge ([c1'], [c1'']) \in R1 \wedge ([c2'], [c2'']) \in R2$   
 $\wedge b' \equiv_d b''$

by force

**with**  $p2$   $R0\text{-def}$  **obtain**  $\iota''' b''' c1''' c2'''$  **where**  
**passump2:**  $V''' = [\text{if } \iota''' b''' \text{ then } c1''' \text{ else } c2''' \text{ fi}]$   
 $\wedge \iota''' \notin (\text{set } (\text{PPc } c1) \cup \text{set } (\text{PPc } c2))$   
 $\wedge ([c1'], [c1''']) \in R1 \wedge ([c2'], [c2''']) \in R2$   
 $\wedge b'' \equiv_d b'''$   
**by** force

**with**  $\text{passump1}$   $\text{transR1}$   $\text{transR2}$   $d\text{-indistinguishable-trans}$   
**have**  $([c1'], [c1''']) \in R1 \wedge ([c2'], [c2''']) \in R2$   
 $\wedge b' \equiv_d b'''$   
**by** (*metis transD*)

**with**  $\text{passump1}$   $\text{passump2}$   $R0\text{-def}$  **have**  $(V', V''') \in R0$   
**by** auto

}

thus ?thesis unfolding trans-def by blast

qed

next

fix  $V V'$

assume  $\text{inR0}: (V, V') \in R0$

with  $R0\text{-def}$  show  $\text{length } V = \text{length } V'$  by auto

next

fix  $V' V'' i$

assume  $\text{inR0}: (V', V'') \in R0$

assume  $\text{irange}: i < \text{length } V'$

assume  $\text{notIDC}: \neg IDC d (V'!i) (\text{htchLoc} (\text{pp} (V'!i)))$

from  $\text{inR0}$   $R0\text{-def}$  **obtain**  $\iota' \iota'' b' b'' c1' c1'' c2' c2''$

**where**  $R0\text{pair}: V' = [\text{if } \iota' b' \text{ then } c1' \text{ else } c2' \text{ fi}]$

$\wedge V'' = [\text{if } \iota'' b'' \text{ then } c1'' \text{ else } c2'' \text{ fi}]$

$\wedge \iota' \notin \text{set } (\text{PPc } c1) \cup \text{set } (\text{PPc } c2)$

$\wedge \iota'' \notin \text{set } (\text{PPc } c1) \cup \text{set } (\text{PPc } c2)$

$\wedge ([c1'], [c1'']) \in R1 \wedge ([c2'], [c2'']) \in R2$

$\wedge b' \equiv_d b''$

b<sup>y</sup> force

have  $NDC d (\text{if } \iota' b' \text{ then } c1' \text{ else } c2' \text{ fi})$

proof –

{

fix  $m$

from  $\text{nextmem-exists-and-unique}$  obtain  $m' p \alpha$  **where**  $\text{ifnextmem}:$

$\langle \text{if } \iota' b' \text{ then } c1' \text{ else } c2' \text{ fi}, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m' \rangle$

$\wedge (\forall m''. (\exists p \alpha. \langle \text{if } \iota' b' \text{ then } c1' \text{ else } c2' \text{ fi}, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m'' \rangle) \rightarrow m'' = m')$

by blast

hence  $m = m'$

```

by (metis MWLsSteps-det.iffalse MWLsSteps-det.iftrue)

with ifnextmem have eqnextmem:
  [[ifi' b' then c1' else c2' fi]](m) = m
  by (simp add: NextMem-def, auto)
}
thus ?thesis
  by (simp add: NDC-def)
qed

with R0pair irange show NDC d (V'!i)
  by simp
next
fix V' V'' i m1 m1' m2 α p
assume inR0: (V',V'') ∈ R0
assume irange: i < length V'
assume step: ⟨V'!i,m1⟩ → □α ⟨p,m2⟩
assume dhequal: m1 ~d,htchLocSet PP m1'

from inR0 R0-def obtain i' i'' b' b'' c1' c1'' c2' c2'' 
  where R0pair: V' = [ifi' b' then c1' else c2' fi]
    ∧ V'' = [ifi'' b'' then c1'' else c2'' fi]
    ∧ i' ∉ set (PPc c1) ∪ set (PPc c2)
    ∧ i'' ∉ set (PPc c1) ∪ set (PPc c2)
    ∧ ([c1'],[c1'']) ∈ R1 ∧ ([c2'],[c2'']) ∈ R2
    ∧ b' ≡d b''
  by force

with R0pair irange step have case-distinction:
  (p = Some c1' ∧ BMap (E b' m1) = True)
  ∨ (p = Some c2' ∧ BMap (E b' m1) = False)
  by (simp, metis MWLsSteps-det-cases(4))
moreover
— Case 1: b evaluates to True
{
assume passump: p = Some c1'
assume eval: BMap (E b' m1) = True

from R0pair step irange have stepconcl: α = [] ∧ m2 = m1
  by (simp, metis MWLs-semantics.MWLsSteps-det-cases(4))

from eval R0pair dhequal have eval': BMap (E b'' m1') = True
  by (simp add: d-indistinguishable-def dH-equal-def, auto)

hence step': ⟨ifi'' b'' then c1'' else c2'' fi, m1'⟩ → □[]⟨Some c1'', m1'⟩
  by (simp add: MWLsSteps-det.iftrue)

with passump R0pair R-def dhequal stepconcl irange

```

```

have  $\exists p' \alpha' m2'. \langle V'!i, m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle p', m2' \rangle \wedge$ 
   $stepResultsinR p p' (R0 \cup R) \wedge$ 
   $((\alpha, \alpha') \in R0 \vee (\alpha, \alpha') \in R) \wedge$ 
   $dhequality-alternative d PP (pp (V'!i)) m2 m2'$ 
  by (simp add: stepResultsinR-def dhequality-alternative-def,
        auto)
}
moreover
— Case 2: b evaluates to False
{
  assume passump:  $p = \text{Some } c2'$ 
  assume eval:  $BMap (E b' m1) = \text{False}$ 

from  $R0pair step irange$  have stepconcl:  $\alpha = [] \wedge m2 = m1$ 
  by (simp, metis MWLs-semantics.MWLsSteps-det-cases(4))

from eval  $R0pair dhequal$  have eval':  $BMap (E b'' m1') = \text{False}$ 
  by (simp add: d-indistinguishable-def dH-equal-def, auto)

hence step':  $\langle \text{if}_t b'' \text{ then } c1'' \text{ else } c2'' f_i, m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft [] \triangleright$ 
   $\langle \text{Some } c2'', m1' \rangle$ 
  by (simp add: MWLsSteps-det.iffalse)

with passump  $R0pair R\text{-def} dhequal stepconcl irange$ 
have  $\exists p' \alpha' m2'. \langle V'!i, m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle p', m2' \rangle \wedge$ 
   $stepResultsinR p p' (R0 \cup R) \wedge$ 
   $((\alpha, \alpha') \in R0 \vee (\alpha, \alpha') \in R) \wedge$ 
   $dhequality-alternative d PP (pp (V'!i)) m2 m2'$ 
  by (simp add: stepResultsinR-def dhequality-alternative-def,
        auto)
}
ultimately
show  $\exists p' \alpha' m2'. \langle V'!i, m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha' \triangleright \langle p', m2' \rangle \wedge$ 
   $stepResultsinR p p' (R0 \cup R) \wedge$ 
   $((\alpha, \alpha') \in R0 \vee (\alpha, \alpha') \in R) \wedge$ 
   $dhequality-alternative d PP (pp (V'!i)) m2 m2'$ 
  by auto
qed

with Areflassump2 Up-To-Technique
have SdlHPPB d PP (R0  $\cup$  R)
  by auto

with inR0 show  $\exists R. SdlHPPB d PP R$ 
   $\wedge ([\text{if}_t b \text{ then } c1 \text{ else } c2 f_i], [\text{if}_t b \text{ then } c1 \text{ else } c2 f_i]) \in R$ 
  by auto
qed

```

```

theorem Compositionality-While:
  assumes dind:  $\forall d. b \equiv_d b$ 
  assumes WWs-body: WHATWHERE-Secure [c]
  assumes uniPPwhile: unique-PPc (whilet b do c od)
  shows WHATWHERE-Secure [whilet b do c od]
proof (simp add: WHATWHERE-Secure-def, auto)
  fix d PP

  from uniPPwhile have pp-difference:  $\iota \notin \text{set } (\text{PPc } c)$ 
  by (simp add: unique-PPc-def)

  from WWs-body obtain R' where R'assump:
    SdlHPPB d PP R'  $\wedge$   $([c],[c]) \in R'$ 
    by (simp add: WHATWHERE-Secure-def, auto)

  — add the empty pair because it is needed later in the proof
  def R  $\equiv \{(V,V'). (V,V') \in R' \wedge \text{set } (\text{PPV } V) \subseteq \text{set } (\text{PPc } c) \wedge$ 
   $\text{set } (\text{PPV } V') \subseteq \text{set } (\text{PPc } c)\} \cup \{(\[],\[])\}$ 

  with R'assump SdlHPPB-restricted-on-PP-is-SdlHPPB
  adding-emptypair-keeps-SdlHPPB
  have SdlHPPR: SdlHPPB d PP R
  proof —
    from R'assump SdlHPPB-restricted-on-PP-is-SdlHPPB have
    SdlHPPB d PP
     $\{(V,V'). (V,V') \in R' \wedge \text{set } (\text{PPV } V) \subseteq \text{set } (\text{PPc } c) \wedge$ 
     $\text{set } (\text{PPV } V') \subseteq \text{set } (\text{PPc } c)\}$ 
    by force

    with adding-emptypair-keeps-SdlHPPB have
    SdlHPPB d PP
     $(\{(V,V'). (V,V') \in R' \wedge \text{set } (\text{PPV } V) \subseteq \text{set } (\text{PPc } c) \wedge$ 
     $\text{set } (\text{PPV } V') \subseteq \text{set } (\text{PPc } c)\} \cup \{(\[],\[])\})$ 
    by auto

    with R-def show ?thesis
    by auto
  qed

  def R1  $\equiv \{(w1,w2). \exists \iota \iota' b b' c1 c1' c2 c2'.$ 
   $w1 = [c1;(\text{while}_{t'} b \text{ do } c2 \text{ od})]$ 
   $\wedge w2 = [c1';(\text{while}_{t'} b' \text{ do } c2' \text{ od})]$ 
   $\wedge \iota \notin \text{set } (\text{PPc } c) \wedge \iota' \notin \text{set } (\text{PPc } c)$ 
   $\wedge ([c1],[c1']) \in R \wedge ([c2],[c2']) \in R$ 
   $\wedge b \equiv_d b'\}$ 

  def R2  $\equiv \{(w1,w2). \exists \iota \iota' b b' c1 c1'.$ 
   $w1 = [\text{while}_t b \text{ do } c1 \text{ od}]$ 
   $\wedge w2 = [\text{while}_{t'} b' \text{ do } c1' \text{ od}]$ 

```

```

 $\wedge \iota \notin \text{set } (PPc c) \wedge \iota' \notin \text{set } (PPc c) \wedge$ 
 $([c1],[c1']) \in R \wedge b \equiv_d b')$ 

def  $R0 \equiv R1 \cup R2$ 

from  $R2\text{-def } R\text{-def } R'\text{assump pp-difference dind}$ 
have  $\text{in}R2: ([\text{while}_\iota b \text{ do } c \text{ od}], [\text{while}_{\iota'} b \text{ do } c \text{ od}]) \in R2$ 
by auto

from  $R0\text{-def } R1\text{-def } R2\text{-def } R\text{-def } R'\text{assump have}$ 
 $\text{Domain } R0 \cap \text{Domain } R = \{\}$ 
by auto

with commonAreft-subset-commonDomain
have  $\text{Arefl} R0 \cap \text{Arefl } R \subseteq \{\}\}$ 
by force

```

— show some facts about R1 and R2 needed later in the proof at several positions

```

from SdlHPPR have  $\text{symR: sym } R$ 
by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def)
from  $\text{symR } R1\text{-def d-indistinguishable-sym}$  have  $\text{symR1: sym } R1$ 
by (simp add: sym-def, fastforce)
from  $\text{symR } R2\text{-def d-indistinguishable-sym}$  have  $\text{symR2: sym } R2$ 
by (simp add: sym-def, fastforce)

have  $\text{disjuptoR1R2:}$ 
 $\text{disj-dlHPP-Bisimulation-Up-To-R' d PP R R0}$ 
proof (simp add: disj-dlHPP-Bisimulation-Up-To-R'-def, auto)
from SdlHPPR show SdlHPPB d PP R
by auto
next
from  $\text{symR1 symR2 R0\text{-def}}$  show  $\text{sym } R0$ 
by (simp add: sym-def)
next
from SdlHPPR have  $\text{transR: trans } R$ 
by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def)
have  $\text{transR1: trans } R1$ 
proof -
{
  fix  $V V' V''$ 
  assume  $p1: (V, V') \in R1$ 
  assume  $p2: (V', V'') \in R1$ 

from  $p1 R1\text{-def obtain } \iota \iota' b b' c1 c1' c2 c2' \text{ where passump1:}$ 
 $V = [c1; (\text{while}_\iota b \text{ do } c2 \text{ od})]$ 
 $\wedge V' = [c1'; (\text{while}_{\iota'} b' \text{ do } c2' \text{ od})]$ 
 $\wedge \iota \notin \text{set } (PPc c) \wedge \iota' \notin \text{set } (PPc c)$ 
 $\wedge ([c1], [c1']) \in R \wedge ([c2], [c2']) \in R$ 

```

$\wedge b \equiv_d b'$   
**by force**

**with**  $p2 R1\text{-def obtain } \iota'' b'' c1'' c2'' \text{ where passump2:}$   
 $V'' = [c1''; (\text{while}_{\iota''} b'' \text{ do } c2'' \text{ od})] \wedge \iota'' \notin \text{set}(PPc c)$   
 $\wedge ([c1],[c1'']) \in R \wedge ([c2],[c2'']) \in R$   
 $\wedge b' \equiv_d b''$   
**by force**

**with**  $\text{passump1 transR d-indistinguishable-trans}$   
**have**  $([c1],[c1'']) \in R \wedge ([c2],[c2'']) \in R \wedge b \equiv_d b''$   
**by** (*metis trans-def*)

**with**  $\text{passump1 passump2 R1\text{-def have } (V, V'') \in R1}$   
**by auto**

}

**thus**  $?thesis$  **unfolding**  $\text{trans-def}$  **by** *blast*

**qed**

**have**  $\text{transR2: trans R2}$

**proof** –

{

**fix**  $V V' V''$   
**assume**  $p1: (V, V') \in R2$   
**assume**  $p2: (V', V'') \in R2$

**from**  $p1 R2\text{-def obtain } \iota' b' b'' c1' c1'' \text{ where passump1:}$

$V = [\text{while}_{\iota} b \text{ do } c1 \text{ od}]$   
 $\wedge V' = [\text{while}_{\iota'} b' \text{ do } c1' \text{ od}]$   
 $\wedge \iota \notin \text{set}(PPc c) \wedge \iota' \notin \text{set}(PPc c)$   
 $\wedge ([c1],[c1']) \in R \wedge b \equiv_d b'$   
**by force**

**with**  $p2 R2\text{-def obtain } \iota'' b'' c1'' c2'' \text{ where passump2:}$

$V'' = [\text{while}_{\iota''} b'' \text{ do } c2'' \text{ od}] \wedge \iota'' \notin \text{set}(PPc c)$   
 $\wedge ([c1],[c1'']) \in R \wedge b' \equiv_d b''$   
**by force**

**with**  $\text{passump1 transR d-indistinguishable-trans}$

**have**  $([c1],[c1'']) \in R \wedge b \equiv_d b''$   
**by** (*metis trans-def*)

**with**  $\text{passump1 passump2 R2\text{-def have } (V, V'') \in R2}$   
**by auto**

}

**thus**  $?thesis$  **unfolding**  $\text{trans-def}$  **by** *blast*

**qed**

**from**  $SdlHPPR$  **have**  $\text{eqlenR: } \forall (V, V') \in R. \text{ length } V = \text{length } V'$

```

by (simp add: Strong-dlHPP-Bisimulation-def)
from R1-def eqlenR have eqlenR1:  $\forall (V, V') \in R1. \text{length } V = \text{length } V'$ 
    by auto
from R2-def eqlenR have eqlenR2:  $\forall (V, V') \in R2. \text{length } V = \text{length } V'$ 
    by auto

from R1-def R2-def have Domain R1 ∩ Domain R2 = {}
    by auto

with commonArefl-subset-commonDomain have Arefl-a:
    Arefl R1 ∩ Arefl R2 = {}
    by force

with symR1 symR2 transR1 transR2 eqlenR1 eqlenR2 trans-RuR'
have trans (R1 ∪ R2)
    by force
with R0-def show trans R0 by auto
next
    fix V V'
    assume inR0: (V, V') ∈ R0
    with R0-def R1-def R2-def show length V = length V' by auto
next
    fix V V' i
    assume inR0: (V, V') ∈ R0
    assume irange: i < length V
    assume notIDC: ¬ IDC d (V!i)
        (htchLoc (pp (V!i)))

from inR0 R0-def R1-def R2-def obtain t t' b b' c1 c1' c2 c2'
    where R0pair: ((V = [c1;(whilet b do c2 od)]
         $\wedge V' = [c1';(while_{t'} b' do c2' od)])$ 
         $\vee (V = [\text{while}_t b \text{ do } c1 \text{ od}] \wedge V' = [\text{while}_{t'} b' \text{ do } c1' \text{ od}])$ 
         $\wedge t \notin \text{set (PPc c)} \wedge t' \notin \text{set (PPc c)}$ 
         $\wedge ([c1],[c1']) \in R \wedge ([c2],[c2']) \in R$ 
         $\wedge b \equiv_d b'$ 
    by force

with irange SdlHPPR strongdlHPPB-NDCIDCaux
    [of d PP R [c1] [c1'] i]
have c1NDCIDC:
    NDC d c1 ∨ IDC d c1 (htchLoc (pp c1))
    by auto

— first alternative for V and V'
have case1: NDC d (c1;(whilet b do c2 od)) ∨
    IDC d (c1;(whilet b do c2 od))
    (htchLoc (pp (c1;(whilet b do c2 od))))
proof —
    have eqnextmem:  $\bigwedge m. \llbracket c1;(\text{while}_t b \text{ do } c2 \text{ od}) \rrbracket(m) = \llbracket c1 \rrbracket(m)$ 

```

```

proof -
  fix  $m$ 
  from nextmem-exists-and-unique obtain  $m'$  where  $c1nextmem$ :
     $\exists p \alpha. \langle c1, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m' \rangle$ 
     $\wedge (\forall m''. (\exists p \alpha. \langle c1, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m'' \rangle) \longrightarrow m'' = m')$ 
    by force

  hence eqdir1:  $\llbracket c1 \rrbracket(m) = m'$ 
  by (simp add: NextMem-def, auto)

  from  $c1nextmem$  obtain  $p \alpha$  where  $\langle c1, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m' \rangle$ 
  by auto

  with  $c1nextmem$  have
     $\exists p \alpha. \langle c1; (while_t b do c2 od), m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m' \rangle$ 
     $\wedge (\forall m''. (\exists p \alpha. \langle c1; (while_t b do c2 od), m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m'' \rangle) \longrightarrow m'' = m')$ 
    by (auto, metis MWLsSteps-det.seq1 MWLsSteps-det.seq2
         option.exhaust, metis MWLsSteps-det-cases(3))

  hence eqdir2:  $\llbracket c1; (while_t b do c2 od) \rrbracket(m) = m'$ 
  by (simp add: NextMem-def, auto)

  with eqdir1 show  $\llbracket c1; (while_t b do c2 od) \rrbracket(m) = \llbracket c1 \rrbracket(m)$ 
  by auto
qed

have eqpp: pp ( $c1; (while_t b do c2 od)$ ) = pp  $c1$ 
by simp

with  $c1NDCIDC$  eqnextmem show
  NDC d ( $c1; (while_t b do c2 od)$ )  $\vee$ 
  IDC d ( $c1; (while_t b do c2 od)$ )
  (htchLoc (pp ( $c1; (while_t b do c2 od)$ )))
  by (simp add: IDC-def NDC-def)
qed

— second alternative for V V'

have case2: NDC d ( $while_t b do c1 od$ )
proof -
  {
    fix  $m$ 
    from nextmem-exists-and-unique obtain  $m' p \alpha$ 
    where whilenextmem:  $\langle while_t b do c1 od, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m' \rangle$ 
     $\wedge (\forall m''. (\exists p \alpha. \langle while_t b do c1 od, m \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m'' \rangle) \longrightarrow m'' = m')$ 
    by blast

    hence  $m = m'$ 
  }

```

```

by (metis MWLsSteps-det.whilefalse MWLsSteps-det.whiletrue)

with whilenextmem have eqnextmem:
  [[whilet b do c1 od]](m) = m
  by (simp add: NextMem-def, auto)
}
thus NDC d (whilet b do c1 od)
  by (simp add: NDC-def)
qed

from R0pair case1 case2 irange notIDC
show NDC d (V!i)
  by force
next
fix V V' i m1 m1' m2 α p
assume inR0: (V, V') ∈ R0
assume irange: i < length V
assume step: ⟨V!i, m1⟩ →α ⟨p, m2⟩
assume dhequal: m1 ~d, htchLocSet PP m1'

from inR0 R0-def R1-def R2-def obtain t t' b b' c1 c1' c2 c2'
  where R0pair: ((V = [c1; (whilet b do c2 od)] ∧ V' = [c1'; (whilet' b' do c2' od)]) ∨ (V = [whilet b do c1 od] ∧ V' = [whilet' b' do c1' od])) ∧ t ∉ set (PPc c) ∧ t' ∉ set (PPc c) ∧ ([c1], [c1']) ∈ R ∧ ([c2], [c2']) ∈ R ∧ b ≡d b'
  by force

— Case 1: V and V' are sequential commands
have case1: [[V = [c1; (whilet b do c2 od)]]; V' = [c1'; (whilet' b' do c2' od)]]]
  ==> ∃ p' α' m2'. ⟨V!i, m1⟩ →α ⟨p', m2'⟩ ∧
    stepResultsinR p p' (R0 ∪ R) ∧ ((α, α') ∈ R0 ∨ (α, α') ∈ R) ∧
    dhequality-alternative d PP (pp (V!i)) m2 m2'
proof -
  assume Vassump: V = [c1; (whilet b do c2 od)]
  assume V'assump: V' = [c1'; (whilet' b' do c2' od)]

  have eqpp: pp (c1; (whilet b do c2 od)) = pp c1
    by simp

  from Vassump irange step irange obtain c3
    where case-distinction:
      (p = Some (whilet b do c2 od) ∧ ⟨c1, m1⟩ →α ⟨None, m2⟩) ∨
      (p = Some (c3; (whilet b do c2 od)) ∧ ⟨c1, m1⟩ →α ⟨Some c3, m2⟩)
    by (simp, metis MWLsSteps-det-cases(3))
  moreover

```

— Case 1a: first command terminates

```
{
  assume passump:  $p = \text{Some } (\text{while}_{\ell} b \text{ do } c2 \text{ od})$ 
  assume stepassump:  $\langle c1, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle \text{None}, m2 \rangle$ 

  with R0pair SdlHPPR dhequal
  strongdlHPPB-aux[of d PP R
  - [c1] [c1'] m1 α None m2 m1']
  obtain p' α' m2' where c1c1'reason:
    p' = None ∧ ⟨c1', m1'⟩ → △left α' △right ⟨p', m2'⟩ ∧ (α, α') ∈ R ∧
    dhequality-alternative d PP (pp c1) m2 m2'
    by (simp add: stepResultsinR-def, fastforce)

  hence conclpart:
    ⟨c1';(while_{\ell}', b' do c2' od),m1'⟩
    → △left α' △right ⟨Some (while_{\ell}', b' do c2' od), m2'⟩
    by (auto, simp add: MWLsSteps-det.seq1)

  from R0pair R0-def R2-def have
    ([while_{\ell} b do c2 od], [while_{\ell}' b' do c2' od]) ∈ R0
    by simp

  with passump V'assump Vassump eqpp conclpart
  c1c1'reason irange
  have ∃ p' α' m2'. ⟨V'!i, m1'⟩ → △left α' △right ⟨p', m2'⟩ ∧
    stepResultsinR p p' (R0 ∪ R) ∧ ((α, α') ∈ R0 ∨
    (α, α') ∈ R) ∧
    dhequality-alternative d PP (pp (V!i)) m2 m2'
    by (simp add: stepResultsinR-def, auto)
}

moreover
— Case 1b: first command does not terminate
{
  assume passump:  $p = \text{Some } (c3;(\text{while}_{\ell} b \text{ do } c2 \text{ od}))$ 
  assume stepassump:  $\langle c1, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle \text{Some } c3, m2 \rangle$ 

  with R0pair SdlHPPR dhequal
  strongdlHPPB-aux[of d PP R
  - [c1] [c1'] m1 α Some c3 m2 m1'
  obtain p' c3' α' m2' where c1c1'reason:
    p' = Some c3' ∧ ⟨c1', m1'⟩ → △left α' △right ⟨p', m2'⟩ ∧
    ([c3],[c3']) ∈ R ∧ (α, α') ∈ R ∧
    dhequality-alternative d PP (pp c1) m2 m2'
    by (simp add: stepResultsinR-def, fastforce)

  hence conclpart:
    ⟨c1';(while_{\ell}', b' do c2' od),m1'⟩ → △left α' △right
    ⟨Some (c3';while_{\ell}', b' do c2' od), m2'⟩
    by (auto, simp add: MWLsSteps-det.seq2)
}
```

```

from c1c1'reason R0pair R0-def R1-def have
  ([c3;whilet b do c2 od],[c3';whilet' b' do c2' od]) ∈ R0
  by simp

with passump V'assump Vassump eqpp conclpart c1c1'reason irange
have ∃ p' α' m2'. ⟨V'!i,m1⟩ →▫α'▫ ⟨p',m2⟩ ∧
  stepResultsinR p p' (R0 ∪ R) ∧
  ((α,α') ∈ R0 ∨ (α,α') ∈ R) ∧
  dhequality-alternative d PP (pp (V!i)) m2 m2'
  by (simp add: stepResultsinR-def, auto)
}

ultimately show ∃ p' α' m2'. ⟨V'!i,m1⟩ →▫α'▫ ⟨p',m2⟩ ∧
  stepResultsinR p p' (R0 ∪ R) ∧
  ((α,α') ∈ R0 ∨ (α,α') ∈ R) ∧
  dhequality-alternative d PP (pp (V!i)) m2 m2'
  by auto
qed

```

— Case 2: V and V' are while commands

```

have case2: [ V = [whilet b do c1 od]; V' = [whilet' b' do c1' od] ]
  ⇒ ∃ p' α' m2'. ⟨V'!i,m1⟩ →▫α'▫ ⟨p',m2⟩ ∧
  stepResultsinR p p' (R0 ∪ R) ∧ ((α,α') ∈ R0 ∨ (α,α') ∈ R) ∧
  dhequality-alternative d PP (pp (V!i)) m2 m2'
proof –
  assume Vassump: V = [whilet b do c1 od]
  assume V'assump: V' = [whilet' b' do c1' od]

```

```

from Vassump irange step have case-distinction:
  (p = None ∧ BMap (E b m1) = False)
  ∨ p = (Some (c1;whilet b do c1 od)) ∧ BMap (E b m1) = True
  by (simp, metis MWLsSteps-det-cases(5) option.simps(2))

```

**moreover**

— Case 2a: b evaluates to False

```

{
  assume passump: p = None
  assume eval: BMap (E b m1) = False

```

```

with Vassump step irange have stepconcl: α = [] ∧ m2 = m1
  by (simp, metis (no-types) MWLsSteps-det-cases(5))

```

```

from eval R0pair dhequal have eval': BMap (E b' m1') = False
  by (simp add: d-indistinguishable-def dH-equal-def, auto)

```

```

hence ⟨whilet' b' do c1' od,m1⟩ →▫[]▫ ⟨None,m1⟩
  by (simp add: MWLsSteps-det.whilefalse)

```

```

with passump R-def Vassump V'assump stepconcl dhequal irange
have ∃ p' α' m2'. ⟨V'!i,m1⟩ →▫α'▫ ⟨p',m2⟩ ∧

```

```

stepResultsinR p p' (R0 ∪ R) ∧ ((α,α') ∈ R0 ∨ (α,α') ∈ R) ∧
dhequality-alternative d PP (pp (V!i)) m2 m2'
  by (simp add: stepResultsinR-def dhequality-alternative-def,
       auto)
}
moreover
— Case 2b: b evaluates to True
{
  assume passump: p = (Some (c1;whilet b do c1 od))
  assume eval: BMap (E b m1) = True

  with Vassump step irange have stepconcl: α = [] ∧ m2 = m1
    by (simp, metis (no-types) MWLsSteps-det-cases(5))

  from eval R0pair dhequal have eval':
    BMap (E b' m1') = True
    by (simp add: d-indistinguishable-def dH-equal-def, auto)

  hence step': ⟨whilet' b' do c1' od, m1'⟩ → ◊[]▷
    ⟨Some (c1';whilet' b' do c1' od), m1'⟩
    by (simp add: MWLsSteps-det.whiletrue)

  from R1-def R0pair have inR1:
    ([c1;whilet b do c1 od],[c1';whilet' b' do c1' od]) ∈ R1
    by auto

  with step' R0-def passump R-def Vassump V'assump
    stepconcl dhequal irange
    have ∃ p' α' m2'. ⟨V!i,m1'⟩ → ◊α'▷ ⟨p',m2'⟩ ∧
      stepResultsinR p p' (R0 ∪ R) ∧ ((α,α') ∈ R0 ∨ (α,α') ∈ R) ∧
      dhequality-alternative d PP (pp (V!i)) m2 m2'
      by (simp add: stepResultsinR-def dhequality-alternative-def,
           auto)
}
ultimately
show ∃ p' α' m2'. ⟨V!i,m1'⟩ → ◊α'▷ ⟨p',m2'⟩ ∧
  stepResultsinR p p' (R0 ∪ R) ∧ ((α,α') ∈ R0 ∨ (α,α') ∈ R) ∧
  dhequality-alternative d PP (pp (V!i)) m2 m2'
  by auto
qed

with case1 R0pair show ∃ p' α' m2'. ⟨V!i,m1'⟩ → ◊α'▷ ⟨p',m2'⟩ ∧
  stepResultsinR p p' (R0 ∪ R) ∧ ((α,α') ∈ R0 ∨ (α,α') ∈ R) ∧
  dhequality-alternative d PP (pp (V!i)) m2 m2'
  by auto
qed

with Areflassump Up-To-Technique
have SdlHPPB d PP (R0 ∪ R)

```

```

by auto

with inR2 R0-def show ∃ R. SdlHPPB d PP R ∧
  ([whilet b do c od], [whilet b do c od]) ∈ R
  by auto
qed

end

end

```

## 4 Security type system

### 4.1 Abstract security type system with soundness proof

We formalize an abstract version of the type system in [2] using locales [1]. Our formalization of the type system is abstract in the sense that the rules specify abstract semantic side conditions on the expressions within a command that satisfy for proving the soundness of the rules. That is, it can be instantiated with different syntactic approximations for these semantic side conditions in order to achieve a type system for a concrete language for Boolean and arithmetic expressions. Obtaining a soundness proof for such a concrete type system then boils down to proving that the concrete type system interprets the abstract type system.

We prove the soundness of the abstract type system by simply applying the compositionality results proven before.

```

theory Type-System
imports Language-Composition
begin

locale Type-System =
  WWP: WHATWHERE-Secure-Programs E BMap DA lH
  for E :: ('exp, 'id, 'val) Evalfunction
  and BMap :: 'val ⇒ bool
  and DA :: ('id, 'd::order) DomainAssignment
  and lH :: ('d, 'exp) lHatches
+
fixes
  AssignSideCondition :: 'id ⇒ 'exp ⇒ nat ⇒ bool
  and WhileSideCondition :: 'exp ⇒ bool
  and IfSideCondition :: 
    'exp ⇒ ('exp, 'id) MWLsCom ⇒ ('exp, 'id) MWLsCom ⇒ bool
assumes semAssignSC: AssignSideCondition x e i ==>
  e ≡DA x, (htchLoc i) e ∧ (∀ m m' d i'. (m ~d, (htchLoc i') m' ∧

```

$\llbracket x :=_t e \rrbracket(m) =_d \llbracket x :=_t e \rrbracket(m')$   
 $\rightarrow \llbracket x :=_t e \rrbracket(m) \sim_{d, (\text{htchLoc } \iota')} \llbracket x :=_t e \rrbracket(m')$   
**and** *semWhileSC*: *WhileSideCondition*  $e \implies \forall d. e \equiv_d e$   
**and** *semIfSC*: *IfSideCondition*  $e c1 c2 \implies \forall d. e \equiv_d e$   
**begin**

— Security typing rules for the language commands

**inductive**

$\text{ComSecTyping} :: ('exp, 'id) \text{ MWLsCom} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$   
 $(\vdash_C -)$   
**and**  $\text{ComSecTypingL} :: ('exp, 'id) \text{ MWLsCom list} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$   
 $(\vdash_V -)$   
**where**  
*Skip*:  $\vdash_C \text{skip}_\iota |$   
*Assign*:  $\llbracket \text{AssignSideCondition } x e \iota \rrbracket \implies \vdash_C x :=_t e |$   
*Spawn*:  $\llbracket \vdash_V V \rrbracket \implies \vdash_C \text{spawn}_\iota V |$   
*Seq*:  $\llbracket \vdash_C c1; \vdash_C c2 \rrbracket \implies \vdash_C c1;c2 |$   
*While*:  $\llbracket \vdash_C c; \text{WhileSideCondition } b \rrbracket$   
 $\implies \vdash_C \text{while}_\iota b \text{ do } c \text{ od} |$   
*If*:  $\llbracket \vdash_C c1; \vdash_C c2; \text{IfSideCondition } b c1 c2 \rrbracket$   
 $\implies \vdash_C \text{if}_\iota b \text{ then } c1 \text{ else } c2 \text{ fi} |$   
*Parallel*:  $\llbracket \forall i < \text{length } V. \vdash_C V!i \rrbracket \implies \vdash_V V$

**inductive-cases parallel-cases:**

$\vdash_V V$

**definition auxiliary-predicate**

**where**

*auxiliary-predicate*  $V \equiv \text{unique-PPV } V \longrightarrow \text{WHATWHERE-Secure } V$

— soundness proof of abstract type system

**theorem** *ComSecTyping-single-is-sound*:

$\llbracket \vdash_C c; \text{unique-PPc } c \rrbracket$   
 $\implies \text{WHATWHERE-Secure } [c]$   
**proof** (*induct rule*: *ComSecTyping-ComSecTypingL.inducts(1)*  
 $[of - - \text{ auxiliary-predicate}], \text{simp-all add: auxiliary-predicate-def})$   
**fix**  $\iota$   
**show** *WHATWHERE-Secure* [ $\text{skip}_\iota$ ]  
**by** (*metis* *WHATWHERE-Secure-Skip*)  
**next**  
**fix**  $x e \iota$   
**assume** *AssignSideCondition*  $x e \iota$   
**thus** *WHATWHERE-Secure* [ $x :=_t e$ ]  
**by** (*metis* *WHATWHERE-Secure-Assign semAssignSC*)  
**next**  
**fix**  $V \iota$   
**assume** *IH*: *unique-PPV*  $V \longrightarrow \text{WHATWHERE-Secure } V$   
**assume** *uniPPspawn*: *unique-PPc* ( $\text{spawn}_\iota V$ )  
**hence** *unique-PPV*  $V$

```

    by (simp add: unique-PPV-def unique-PPc-def)
with IH have WHATWHERE-Secure V
    ..
with uniPPspawn show WHATWHERE-Secure [spawnt V]
    by (metis Compositionality-Spawn)
next
fix c1 c2
assume IH1: unique-PPc c1 ==> WHATWHERE-Secure [c1]
assume IH2: unique-PPc c2 ==> WHATWHERE-Secure [c2]
assume uniPPc1c2: unique-PPc (c1;c2)
from uniPPc1c2 have uniPPc1: unique-PPc c1
    by (simp add: unique-PPc-def)
with IH1 have IS1: WHATWHERE-Secure [c1]
.
from uniPPc1c2 have uniPPc2: unique-PPc c2
    by (simp add: unique-PPc-def)
with IH2 have IS2: WHATWHERE-Secure [c2]
.

from IS1 IS2 uniPPc1c2 show WHATWHERE-Secure [c1;c2]
    by (metis Compositionality-Seq)
next
fix c b t
assume SC: WhileSideCondition b
assume IH: unique-PPc c ==> WHATWHERE-Secure [c]
assume uniPPwhile: unique-PPc (whilet b do c od)
hence unique-PPc c
    by (simp add: unique-PPc-def)
with IH have WHATWHERE-Secure [c]
.
with uniPPwhile SC show WHATWHERE-Secure [whilet b do c od]
    by (metis Compositionality-While semWhileSC)
next
fix c1 c2 b t
assume SC: IfSideCondition b c1 c2
assume IH1: unique-PPc c1 ==> WHATWHERE-Secure [c1]
assume IH2: unique-PPc c2 ==> WHATWHERE-Secure [c2]
assume uniPPif: unique-PPc (ift b then c1 else c2 fi)
from uniPPif have unique-PPc c1
    by (simp add: unique-PPc-def)
with IH1 have IS1: WHATWHERE-Secure [c1]
.
from uniPPif have unique-PPc c2
    by (simp add: unique-PPc-def)
with IH2 have IS2: WHATWHERE-Secure [c2]
.

from IS1 IS2 SC uniPPif show
    WHATWHERE-Secure [ift b then c1 else c2 fi]
    by (metis Compositionality-If semIfSC)

```

```

next
  fix  $V$ 
  assume  $IH: \forall i < length V. \vdash_C V ! i \wedge$ 
     $(unique-PPc (V!i) \rightarrow WHATWHERE-Secure [V!i])$ 
  have  $unique-PPV V \rightarrow (\forall i < length V. unique-PPc (V!i))$ 
    by (metis uniPPV-uniPPc)
  with  $IH$  have  $unique-PPV V \rightarrow (\forall i < length V. WHATWHERE-Secure [V!i])$ 

    by auto
  thus  $uniPPV: unique-PPV V \rightarrow WHATWHERE-Secure V$ 
    by (metis parallel-composition)
qed

theorem ComSecTyping-list-is-sound:
 $\llbracket \vdash_V V; unique-PPV V \rrbracket \implies WHATWHERE-Secure V$ 
by (metis ComSecTyping-single-is-sound parallel-cases
  parallel-composition uniPPV-uniPPc)

end

end

```

## 4.2 Example language for Boolean and arithmetic expressions

As an example, we provide a simple example language for instantiating the parameter '*exp*' for the language for Boolean and arithmetic expressions (from the entry Strong-Security).

```

theory Expr
imports Types
begin

— type parameters:
— 'val': numbers, boolean constants....
— 'id': identifier names

type-synonym ('val) operation = 'val list  $\Rightarrow$  'val

datatype ('id, 'val) Expr =
  Const 'val |
  Var 'id |
  Op 'val operation (('id, 'val) Expr) list

— defining a simple recursive evaluation function on this datatype

```

```

primrec ExprEval :: (('id, 'val) Expr, 'id, 'val) Evalfunction
and ExprEvalL :: (('id, 'val) Expr) list  $\Rightarrow$  ('id, 'val) State  $\Rightarrow$  'val list
where
  ExprEval (Const v) m = v |
  ExprEval (Var x) m = (m x) |
  ExprEval (Op f arglist) m = (f (ExprEvalL arglist m)) |

  ExprEvalL [] m = [] |
  ExprEvalL (e#V) m = (ExprEval e m)#(ExprEvalL V m)

end

```

### 4.3 Example interpretation of abstract security type system

Using the example instantiation of the language for Boolean and arithmetic expressions, we give an example instantiation of our abstract security type system, instantiating the parameter for domains '*d*' with a two-level security lattice (from the entry Strong-Security).

```

theory Domain-example
imports Expr
begin

— When interpreting, we have to instantiate the type for domains. As an example, we take a type containing 'low' and 'high' as domains.

datatype Dom = low | high

instantiation Dom :: order
begin

definition
less-eq-Dom-def: d1  $\leq$  d2 = (if d1 = d2 then True  

else (if d1 = low then True else False))

definition
less-Dom-def: d1 < d2 = (if d1 = d2 then False  

else (if d1 = low then True else False))

```

```

instance proof
fix x y z :: Dom
show (x < y) = (x  $\leq$  y  $\wedge$   $\neg$  y  $\leq$  x)
  unfolding less-eq-Dom-def less-Dom-def by auto
show x  $\leq$  x unfolding less-eq-Dom-def by auto
show [x  $\leq$  y; y  $\leq$  z]  $\Longrightarrow$  x  $\leq$  z
  unfolding less-eq-Dom-def by ((split split-if-asm)+, auto)

```

```

show  $\llbracket x \leq y; y \leq x \rrbracket \implies x = y$ 
  unfolding less-eq-Dom-def by ((split split-if-asm)+,
    auto, (split split-if-asm)+, auto)
qed

end

end

```

```

theory Type-System-example
imports Type-System .. / Strong-Security / Expr .. / Strong-Security / Domain-example
begin

```

— When interpreting, we have to instantiate the type for domains. As an example, we take a type containing 'low' and 'high' as domains.

```

consts DA :: ('id, Dom) DomainAssignment
consts BMap :: 'val  $\Rightarrow$  bool
consts LH :: (Dom, ('id, 'val) Expr) lHatches

```

— redefine all the abbreviations necessary for auxiliary lemmas with the correct parameter instantiation

```

abbreviation MWLsStepsdet' :: 
  (('id, 'val) Expr, 'id, 'val, (('id, 'val) Expr, 'id) MWLsCom) TLSteps-curry
  ((1⟨-,/-⟩)  $\rightarrow$  □-▷ / (1⟨-,/-⟩) [0,0,0,0,0] 81)
where
 $\langle c1, m1 \rangle \rightarrow^{\triangleleft\alpha\triangleright} \langle c2, m2 \rangle \equiv$ 
   $((c1, m1), \alpha, (c2, m2)) \in \text{MWLs-semantics.MWLsSteps-det ExprEval BMap}$ 

```

```

abbreviation d-equal' :: ('id, 'val) State
   $\Rightarrow$  Dom  $\Rightarrow$  ('id, 'val) State  $\Rightarrow$  bool
  ( (- = -) )
where
 $m =_d m' \equiv \text{WHATWHERE.d-equal DA } d \ m \ m'$ 

```

```

abbreviation dH-equal' :: ('id, 'val) State  $\Rightarrow$  Dom
   $\Rightarrow$  (Dom, ('id, 'val) Expr) Hatches
   $\Rightarrow$  ('id, 'val) State  $\Rightarrow$  bool
  ( (- ~ -,-) )
where
 $m \sim_{d,H} m' \equiv \text{WHATWHERE.dH-equal ExprEval DA } d \ H \ m \ m'$ 

```

```

abbreviation NextMem' :: (('id, 'val) Expr, 'id) MWLsCom
   $\Rightarrow$  ('id, 'val) State  $\Rightarrow$  ('id, 'val) State
  ( $\llbracket - \rrbracket '(-')$ )
where

```

$\llbracket c \rrbracket(m)$   
 $\equiv \text{WHATWHERE}.\text{NextMem } (\text{MWLs-semantics}.\text{MWLsSteps-det ExprEval BMap})$   
 $c m$

**abbreviation**  $dH\text{-indistinguishable}' :: ('id, 'val) \text{ Expr} \Rightarrow \text{Dom}$   
 $\Rightarrow (\text{Dom}, ('id, 'val) \text{ Expr}) \text{ Hatches} \Rightarrow ('id, 'val) \text{ Expr} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$   
 $((- \equiv_{-, -} -))$   
**where**  
 $e1 \equiv_{d,H} e2$   
 $\equiv \text{WHATWHERE-Secure-Programs}.dH\text{-indistinguishable ExprEval DA d H e1 e2}$

**abbreviation**  $htchLoc :: \text{nat} \Rightarrow (\text{Dom}, ('id, 'val) \text{ Expr}) \text{ Hatches}$   
**where**  
 $htchLoc \iota \equiv \text{WHATWHERE}.htchLoc lH \iota$

— Security typing rules for expressions

**inductive**  
 $\text{ExprSecTyping} :: (\text{Dom}, ('id, 'val) \text{ Expr}) \text{ Hatches}$   
 $\Rightarrow ('id, 'val) \text{ Expr} \Rightarrow \text{Dom} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$   
 $(- \vdash_{\mathcal{E}} - : -)$   
**for**  $H :: (\text{Dom}, ('id, 'val) \text{ Expr}) \text{ Hatches}$   
**where**  
 $\text{Consts}: H \vdash_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{Const } v) : d$  |  
 $\text{Vars}: DA x = d \implies H \vdash_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{Var } x) : d$  |  
 $\text{Hatch}: (d, e) \in H \implies H \vdash_{\mathcal{E}} e : d$  |  
 $\text{Ops}: \llbracket \forall i < \text{length arglist}. H \vdash_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{arglist}!i) : (dl!i) \wedge (dl!i) \leq d \rrbracket$   
 $\implies H \vdash_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{Op } f \text{ arglist}) : d$

— function substituting a certain expression with another expression in expressions

**primrec**  $\text{Subst} :: ('id, 'val) \text{ Expr} \Rightarrow ('id, 'val) \text{ Expr}$   
 $\Rightarrow ('id, 'val) \text{ Expr} \Rightarrow ('id, 'val) \text{ Expr}$   
 $(- <- \backslash - >)$   
**and**  $\text{SubstL} :: ('id, 'val) \text{ Expr list} \Rightarrow ('id, 'val) \text{ Expr}$   
 $\Rightarrow ('id, 'val) \text{ Expr} \Rightarrow ('id, 'val) \text{ Expr list}$   
**where**  
 $(\text{Const } v) < e1 \backslash e2 > = (\text{if } e1 = (\text{Const } v) \text{ then } e2 \text{ else } (\text{Const } v))$  |  
 $(\text{Var } x) < e1 \backslash e2 > = (\text{if } e1 = (\text{Var } x) \text{ then } e2 \text{ else } (\text{Var } x))$  |  
 $(\text{Op } f \text{ arglist}) < e1 \backslash e2 > = (\text{if } e1 = (\text{Op } f \text{ arglist}) \text{ then } e2 \text{ else } (\text{Op } f (\text{SubstL arglist } e1 e2)))$  |

$\text{SubstL} [] e1 e2 = []$  |  
 $\text{SubstL} (e \# V) e1 e2 = (e < e1 \backslash e2 >) \# (\text{SubstL } V e1 e2)$

**definition**  $\text{SubstClosure} :: 'id \Rightarrow ('id, 'val) \text{ Expr} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$   
**where**  
 $\text{SubstClosure } x e \equiv \forall (d', e', \iota') \in lH. (d', e' < (\text{Var } x) \backslash e >, \iota') \in lH$

```

definition synAssignSC :: 'id ⇒ ('id, 'val) Expr ⇒ nat ⇒ bool
where
synAssignSC x e i ≡ ∃ d. ((htchLoc i) ⊢Ε e : d ∧ d ≤ DA x)
∧ (SubstClosure x e)

definition synWhileSC :: ('id, 'val) Expr ⇒ bool
where
synWhileSC e ≡ (∃ d. ({}) ⊢Ε e : d) ∧ (∀ d'. d ≤ d')

definition synIfSC :: ('id, 'val) Expr
⇒ (('id, 'val) Expr, 'id) MWLsCom
⇒ (('id, 'val) Expr, 'id) MWLsCom ⇒ bool
where
synIfSC e c1 c2 ≡ ∃ d. ({}) ⊢Ε e : d ∧ (∀ d'. d ≤ d')

```

— auxiliary lemma for locale interpretation (theorem 7 in original paper)

**lemma** ExprTypable-with-smallerd-implies-dH-indistinguishable:

$$[\![ H \vdash_{\mathcal{E}} e : d'; d' \leq d ]\!] \implies e \equiv_{d,H} e$$

**proof** (induct rule: ExprSecTyping.induct,

- simp-all add: WHATWHERE-Secure-Programs.dH-indistinguishable-def
- WHATWHERE.dH-equal-def WHATWHERE.d-equal-def, auto)

**fix** dl arglist f m1 m2 d' d

**assume** main:  $\forall i < \text{length arglist}. (H \vdash_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{arglist}!i) : (dl!i)) \wedge (dl!i \leq d \longrightarrow$

$$(\forall m1 m2. (\forall x. DA x \leq d \longrightarrow m1 x = m2 x) \wedge$$

$$(\forall (d',e) \in H. d' \leq d \longrightarrow \text{ExprEval } e m1 = \text{ExprEval } e m2) \longrightarrow$$

$$\text{ExprEval } (\text{arglist}!i) m1 = \text{ExprEval } (\text{arglist}!i) m2) \wedge dl!i \leq d'$$

**assume** smaller:  $d' \leq d$

**assume** eqeval:  $\forall (d',e) \in H. d' \leq d \longrightarrow \text{ExprEval } e m1 = \text{ExprEval } e m2$

**assume** eqstate:  $\forall x. DA x \leq d \longrightarrow m1 x = m2 x$

**from** main smaller **have** irangesubst:

$$\forall i < \text{length arglist}. dl!i \leq d$$

**by** (metis order-trans)

**with** eqstate eqeval main **have**

$$\forall i < \text{length arglist}. \text{ExprEval } (\text{arglist}!i) m1$$

$$= \text{ExprEval } (\text{arglist}!i) m2$$

**by** force

**hence** substmap:  $(\text{ExprEvalL arglist m1}) = (\text{ExprEvalL arglist m2})$

**by** (induct arglist, auto, force)

**show** f (ExprEvalL arglist m1) = f (ExprEvalL arglist m2)

**by** (subst substmap, auto)

**qed**

— auxiliary lemma about substitutions in expressions and in memories  
**lemma** *substexp-substmem*:

$$\begin{aligned} \textit{ExprEval } e' < \textit{Var } x \setminus e > m &= \textit{ExprEval } e' (m(x := \textit{ExprEval } e m)) \\ &\wedge \textit{ExprEvalL } (\textit{SubstL } \textit{elist } (\textit{Var } x) e) m \\ &= \textit{ExprEvalL } \textit{elist } (m(x := \textit{ExprEval } e m)) \end{aligned}$$

**by** (*induct-tac* *e'* **and** *elist*, *simp-all*)

— another auxiliary lemma for locale interpretation (lemma 8 in original paper)

**lemma** *SubstClosure-implications*:

$$\begin{aligned} &\llbracket \textit{SubstClosure } x e; m \sim_{d,(\textit{htchLoc } \iota')} m' ; \\ &\llbracket x :=_t e \rrbracket(m) =_d \llbracket x :=_t e \rrbracket(m') \llbracket \\ &\implies \llbracket x :=_t e \rrbracket(m) \sim_{d,(\textit{htchLoc } \iota')} \llbracket x :=_t e \rrbracket(m') \end{aligned}$$

**proof** —

fix *m1 m1'*

**assume** *substclosure*: *SubstClosure x e*

**assume** *dequalm2*:  $\llbracket x :=_t e \rrbracket(m1) =_d \llbracket x :=_t e \rrbracket(m1')$

**assume** *dhequalm1*:  $m1 \sim_{d,(\textit{htchLoc } \iota')} m1'$

**from** *MWLs-semantics.nextmem-exists-and-unique obtain m2 where m1step*:

$$\begin{aligned} &(\exists p \alpha. \langle x :=_t e, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m2 \rangle) \\ &\wedge (\forall m''. (\exists p \alpha. \langle x :=_t e, m1 \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m'' \rangle) \longrightarrow m'' = m2) \end{aligned}$$

**by force**

**hence** *m2-is-next*:  $\llbracket x :=_t e \rrbracket(m1) = m2$

**by** (*simp add*: *WHATWHERE.NextMem-def*, *auto*)

**from** *m1step MWLs-semantics.MWLsSteps-det.assign*

[of *ExprEval e m1 - x i BMap*]

**have** *m2eq*:  $m2 = m1(x := (\textit{ExprEval } e m1))$

**by** *auto*

**from** *MWLs-semantics.nextmem-exists-and-unique obtain m2' where m1'step*:

$$\begin{aligned} &(\exists p \alpha. \langle x :=_t e, m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m2' \rangle) \\ &\wedge (\forall m''. (\exists p \alpha. \langle x :=_t e, m1' \rangle \rightarrow \triangleleft \alpha \triangleright \langle p, m'' \rangle) \longrightarrow m'' = m2') \end{aligned}$$

**by force**

**hence** *m2'-is-next*:  $\llbracket x :=_t e \rrbracket(m1') = m2'$

**by** (*simp add*: *WHATWHERE.NextMem-def*, *auto*)

**from** *m1'step MWLs-semantics.MWLsSteps-det.assign*

[of *ExprEval e m1' - x i BMap*]

**have** *m2'eq*:  $m2' = m1'(x := (\textit{ExprEval } e m1'))$

**by** *auto*

**from** *m2eq substexp-substmem*

**have** *substeval1*:  $\forall e'. \textit{ExprEval } (e' < \textit{Var } x \setminus e >) m1 = \textit{ExprEval } e' m2$

**by** *force*

**from** *m2'eq substexp-substmem*

**have** *substeval2*:  $\forall e'. \textit{ExprEval } e' < \textit{Var } x \setminus e > m1' = \textit{ExprEval } e' m2'$

**by** *force*

```

from substclosure have
   $\forall (d',e') \in \text{htchLoc } \iota'. (d',e' \langle \text{Var } x \setminus e \rangle) \in (\text{htchLoc } \iota')$ 
  by (simp add: SubstClosure-def WHATWHERE.htchLoc-def, auto)

with dhequalm1 have
   $\forall (d',e') \in \text{htchLoc } \iota'.$ 
   $d' \leq d \longrightarrow \text{ExprEval } e' \langle \text{Var } x \setminus e \rangle m1 = \text{ExprEval } e' \langle \text{Var } x \setminus e \rangle m1'$ 
  by (simp add: WHATWHERE.dH-equal-def, auto)

with substeval1 substeval2 have
   $\forall (d',e') \in \text{htchLoc } \iota'.$ 
   $d' \leq d \longrightarrow \text{ExprEval } e' m2 = \text{ExprEval } e' m2'$ 
  by auto

with dequalm2 m2-is-next m2'-is-next
show  $\llbracket x :=_t e \rrbracket(m1) \sim_{d,\text{htchLoc } \iota'} \llbracket x :=_t e \rrbracket(m1')$ 
  by (simp add: WHATWHERE.dH-equal-def)
qed

— interpretation of the abstract type system using the above definitions for the
side conditions
interpretation Type-System-example: Type-System ExprEval BMap DA lH
  synAssignSC synWhileSC synIfSC
  by (unfold-locales, auto,
    metis ExprTypable-with-smallerd-implies-dH-indistinguishable
    synAssignSC-def,
    metis SubstClosure-implications synAssignSC-def,
    simp add: synWhileSC-def,
    metis ExprTypable-with-smallerd-implies-dH-indistinguishable
    WHATWHERE-Secure-Programs.empH-implies-dHindistinguishable-eq-dindistinguishable,
    simp add: synIfSC-def,
    metis ExprTypable-with-smallerd-implies-dH-indistinguishable
    WHATWHERE-Secure-Programs.empH-implies-dHindistinguishable-eq-dindistinguishable)

end

```

## References

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