CoSP: A Framework for Computational Soundness Dolev-Yao abstractions of cryptographic operations are term algebras that are meant to capture an attacker's knowledge and capabilities against a set of cryptographic operations. Encryption, e.g., can be modeled by simple rules of the form "dec(dk(r), enc(ek(r), m)) = m", where "m" represents a plaintext, "ek(r),dk(r)" an encryption- decryption key pair, and "enc" and "dec" functions of such terms. Such rules also define a Dolev-Yao attacker that only applies the rules. Dolev-Yao abstractions have been successfully used in automated protocol verifiers. Another largely unexplored advantage of Dolev-Yao abstraction is their power to enrich information flow control techniques with automatically derivable declassification rules. While Dolev-Yao abstractions provide a useful representation for automated verification, each such abstraction has to be proven to actually capture all relevant attacks. To this end, a statement of the following form -- a computational soundness result -- has to be proven: whenever a security property holds in a model where cryptography is represented as Dolev-Yao abstractions and the corresponding Dolev-Yao attacker is considered, this security property also holds in a model where the actual cryptographic algorithms are used and cryptographic attackers (i.e., arbitrary randomized poly-time machines) are considered. In this talk, I will present CoSP, a unifying rigorous framework for computational soundness proofs, including recent extension to equivalence properties and interactive primitive. The big advantage of CoSP is that it offers a reference point to which programming languages can be modularly embedded in a sound way, as already done for RCF (a core calculus for F#) and the applied pi-calculus. I will, furthermore, briefly talk about a work in progress: we use CoSP to enrich the ADL semantic (Cassandra's representation of DEX Bytecode) with computationally sound declassification rules that are canonically derived from a Dolev-Yao abstraction.